CHAPTER COMMENTARY
VIGNETTE 1A TRIP TO THE "GOVERNOR'S HOUSE" GOES BAD
VIGNETTE 2: THE BATTLE FOR MUSA OALEH
VIGNETTE 3: ESCAPE FROM THE ARGHANDAY ENCIRCLEMENT
VIGNETTE 1: KIDNAPING A SOVIET ADVISER
VIGNETTE 2: FOUR URBAN BOMB ATTACKS
VIGNETTE 3: INCIDENT AT QALA-E JABAR
VIGNETTE 5 - REMOTE-CONTROL ATTACK ON A CONVOY IN THE SUBURBS
VIGNETTE 6 - ATTACK ON THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
VIGNETTE 7 - ALCOHOL CAN BE DEADLY
VIGNETTE 8 - RAID ON BALAHESSAR FORTRESS
VIGNETTE 9 - RAID ON THE KABUL METROPOLITAN Bus TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
VIGNETTE 10 - WEAPONS RAID IN CHARIKAR
VIGNETTE 11 - NIGHT RAID ON A CITY OUTPOST
VIGNETTE 12 - RAID ON KANDAHAR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
VIGNETTE 13 - ATTACK ON KHAD HEADQUARTERS
Vignette 14 - Raid on 15 Division Garrison
INTRODUCTION
As we have throughout our history—the Philippines, Haiti,Nicaragua, Lebanon, Vietnam and Somalia—Marines will encounterguerrilla forces in the 21st century. Marines must understand potentialadversaries, and learn as much as possible about them. Themujahideen of the Soviet-Afghan War prevailed against a larger anddecisively better equipped foe, the Soviet Army. The Other Side of theMountain presents the story of the mujahideen's fight against that foe.
On 27 December 1979, Moscow ordered the Soviet Army into Afghanistan. Organized, equipped, and trained for the execution ofcombined arms operations, that force embodied the concept ofblitzkrieg. Nine years later, it withdrew in defeat. The Other Side ofthe Mountain was written from the reports of mujahideen combat veterans and provides a tactical look at a decentralized army of foot-mobile guerrillas waging war against a technologically superior foe. Absolute supremacy of firepower did not guarantee victory. Native knowledge of terrain and detailed study of a known adversary offsetthat advantage. In particular, the chapter on urban combat will be ofgreat interest to commanders concerned with force protection. This book and its companion volume, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, published for the United StatesMarine Corps in 1996, offers a chronicle of the Afghan War by the war fighters.
The Marine Corps of the 21st century will have tremendous advan-tages over guerrilla forces. Our equipment, technology, training, and support are the best in the world. Yet, technological superiority is notin and of itself a guarantee of success. Insight into our adversary's capabilities, tactics and motivation will provide the decisive edge. The Other Side of the Mountain will help us gain this insight. I heartily recommend this book to all Marines.
J. E. RHODESCommanding General,Marine Corps Combat Development Command
FOREWORD
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few expertsbelieved that the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had achance of withstanding the modern, mechanized, technologically-advanced Soviet Army. Most stated that resistance was futile and thatthe Soviet Union had deliberately expanded their empire to the south.The Soviet Union had come to stay. Although some historians lookedat the British experience fighting the Afghan mountain tribesmen,most experts discounted any parallels since the Soviet Union pos-sessed an unprecedented advantage in fire power, technology andmilitary might. Although Arab leaders and the West supplied armsand material to the Mujahideen, they did so with the hope of creat-ing a permanent, bleeding ulcer on the Soviet flank, not defeatingthe Soviet Union. They did not predict that the Soviet Union wouldvoluntarily withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.
What caused the Soviet withdrawal? The Soviets realized thatthey were trapped in an unwinnable war where they were suffering"death from a thousand cuts" by an intractable enemy who had no hopeof winning, but fought on because it was the right thing to do. Afterfailing to achieve military victory, the Soviet Union cut its losses andwithdrew. The Soviet Union lost 13,833 killed. Over 1.3 millionAfghans died and over a third of the population became
