refugees. Mosthave not yet returned to war-torn Afghanistan.
There have been few studies of guerrilla warfare from the guer-rilla's perspective. To capture this perspective and the tactical experi-ence of the Mujahideen, the United States Marine Corps commissioned this study and sent two retired combat veterans to interview Mujahideen. The authors were well received and generously assisted by various Mujahideen who willingly talked about their long, bitter war. The authors have produced a unique book which tells the guerrillas' story as interpreted by military professionals. This is a book about small-unit guerrilla combat. This is a book about death and survival, adaptation and perseverance.
This is a book for the combat-arms company and field grade officer and NCO. It provides an understanding of guerrilla field craft, tactics, techniques and procedures. It has application in Basic and AdvancedOfficer and NCO courses as well as special warfare courses. Seniorleaders will also find valuable insights for training and supportingguerrilla forces as well as defending against guerrilla forces. This book is a companion piece to The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan which National Defense University press published in 1996.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book would not be possible without the open, friendly and will-ing support of the many Mujahideen we interviewed. We thankMawlawi Abdul-Rahman, Haidar Ahmadi, Mohammad Akbar,Akhtarjhan, Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai, Assadullah MohammadAsef, Assadullah, Mawlawi Mohayddin Baloch, Abdul Baqi Balots,Abdul Nasrin Baz, Commander Didar, Daoud, Gulaga Farid, GhulamFarouq, Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani, Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, AbdulGhani, Sofi Lal Gul, Wazir Gul, Tsaranwal Sher Habib, HajiHabibulah, Ghulam Haidar, Haji Sayed Mohammad Hanif, MawlaliNezamuddin Haqani, Hedayatullah, Toryalai Hemat, EngineerMohammad Ibrahim, Mohammad Shah Kako, Asef Khan, Asil Khan,Haji Badshah Khan, Nawaz Khan, Counsel General Haji AbdulKhaleq, Haji Badshah Khan, Major Sher Aqa Kochay, Lalai, MullaMalang, Haji Malangyar, Akhtar Mohammad, Amir Mohammad, HajiLal Mohammad, Haji Pir Mohammad, Engineer Sayed Mohammad,Qari Feda Mohammad, Sultan Mohammad, Mohammad AminMudaqeq, Haji Nematullah, Lieutenant Zabet Omar, Sher Padshah,Haji Abdul Qader, Akhund Zada Qasem, Mawlawi Qasem, LTC HajiMohammad Rahim, Abdul Razek, Mohammad Saber, Abdul Sabur,Doctor Mohammad Sadeq, Amin Safi, Haji Aaquelshah Sahak, AbdulSadiq Sahebzada, Sarshar, Haji Mohammad Seddiq, Shahabuddin,Haji Mohammad Shah, Mohammad Humayun Shahin, MawlawiAbdul Shukur Yasini, Haji Sidiqullah, Qazi Guljan Tayeb, GeneralAbdul Rahim Wardak, Doctor Mohammad Wakil, Doctor MohammadWali, Haji Mohammad Yakub, General Gulzarak Zadran and Zakarifor generously sharing their time and experience. We can only hopethat peace will finally come to Afghanistan so that they can start thelong, difficult job of rebuilding their shattered country. Our special thanks for the generous hospitality and supportextended to us by Nancy Dupree of the Agency Coordinating Body forAfghan Relief, Pir Gailani, Mr. Kamaluddin of the Afghan MediaResource Center, Abdul Ahad Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karzai, GeneralCounsel Haji Abdul Khaleq, Vice Counsel Muhammad Wali Naeemiand Abdul Ghani Wardak.
A special thanks to our colleague, Major Nasrullah Safi, who wentinto areas of Afghanistan to conduct interviews where we could not go. We contacted several major Mujahideen commanders such as Ismail Khan, Masood, Abdul Haq, and Jalaluddin Haqani for interviews and material, but we were unable to meet with them before the book dead-line. Our thanks in advance for the privilege of returning at a future time to conduct those interviews and to include them in a follow-on book.
Our special thanks to Colonel David O. Smith, Lieutenant ColonelTerry Cook, Captain Bob Hehl and TSGT Barry Cuthbertson of theUnited States Defense Attache Office in Islamabad and PrincipalOfficer of the United States Consulate in Peshawar, Brad Hanson.
The United States Marine Corps funded the research, writing andpublication of this book. Charlie Cutshaw, Karen Dolan and Dick Voltzof the USMC Studies and Analysis Division at Quantico, Virginiaprovided funding for printing The Bear Went Over The Mountain:Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and agreed to underwrite theproduction of this counterpart volume on Mujahideen tactics. ColonelCharles Johnston, the former Director of the U.S. Army ForeignMilitary Studies Office (FMSO) enthusiastically supported theresearch and production as did FMSO Director Dr. Graham Turbiville,and FMSO analysts Dr. Jacob Kipp, Tim Thomas and Major RayFinch. Robert Love helped with translation support and Linda Prideand Al Lindman provided computer assistance. The Combined ArmsResearch Library and Command and General Staff College MapLibrary at Fort Leavenworth provided invaluable assistance. AliceMink of FMSO kept the whole production on time and under budget.
A "band of brothers," skilled in tactics, read and provided commen-tary on the manuscript. Our special thanks to Colonel (Ret) David M.Glantz of Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Colonel (Ret.) Charles E. Johnston,former Director of FMSO; Colonel (Ret) William M. Mendel of FMSO;Allen E. Curtis, Director of Intelligence and Security at the NationalTraining Center; former Marine Captain (Ret) Tim Leaf of Quantico,Virginia; Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray of CENTCOM; LieutenantColonel Karl Prinslow of FMSO; and Major Darr Reimers of the 1stCavalry Division. Mary Ann Glantz graciously edited the manuscript. JonathanPierce was the book editor/designer, Rhonda Gross created the initialmap graphics, and Emily Pierce did a superb job of finishing the mapsand designing the cover.
Homaira Jalali and Gina Grau showed remarkably good humorand supported the efforts of their husbands as they gathered the mate-rial and worked on the book. We thank all of you for your help. Any mistakes are the authors.
PREFACE
Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic state in southwest Asia, is home todiverse social communities that share common experience throughinteraction with dominant states, empires, invading armies, tradeand cultural movements that traversed the land during their thou-sands of years of history. The different ethnic groups in modernAfghanistan (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian-speakingHazaras, Balochis, etc.) straddle the boundries of the state. However,their national identity is mostly defined by their differences withtheir ethnic kinsmen across the borders rather than their nationalcommonalities. About 99% of Afghanistan's over 17 million popula-tion are Muslim, of which 85% are followers of the Sunni sect whilethe rest are Shia. About 85% of Afghans live in rural communities ina land dominated by mountains and deserts. Modern travel isprimarily restricted to a highway ring connecting the various cities.There is no railroad network. Afghanistan has mostly been a loose collection of tribes and nation-alities over which central governments had varying degrees of influ-ence and control at different times. The country has been historicallyknown for its remarkable Islamic and ethnic tolerence. However trib-al rivalries and blood feuds, ambitions of local chieftains, and tribaldefiance of pervasive interference by the central government have keptthe different parts of the land at war at different times. In such casesthe kinship-based identity has been the major means of the communi-ty's political and military mobilization. Such identity places fargreater importance on kinship and extended family than ideology.
Afghanistan stands at a geographic crossroads that has seen thepassage of many warring peoples. Each of these has left their imprinton the ancient land and involved the people of Afghanistan in conflictOften this conflict got in the way of economic development. What hasdeveloped is a country composed of somewhat autonomous "villagestates" spread across the entire country.1 Afghans identify themselvesby Qawm—the basic subnational identity based on kinship, residenceand sometimes occupation. Western people may refer to this as "tribe",but this instinctive social cohesiveness includes tribal clans, ethnic 1 Ali A. Jalali, "Clashes of Ideas and Interests in Afghanistan", paper given at the Instituteof World Politics, Washington, D.C., July 1995, page 4. XIII subgroups, religious sects, locality-based groups and groups united byinterests.2 The Qawm, not Afghanistan, is the basic unit of socialcommunity and, outside the family, the most important focus on indi-vidual loyalty. Afghanistan has,
