in September 1996 and were preparing to go into Afghanistan when the Taliban advance on Kabulclosed the borders to American citizens. Ali interviewed some 40Mujahideen during a month in Peshawar, Quetta, and Islamabad,Pakistan. Our colleague, Major Nasrullah Safi, conducted interviewsfor another two months inside Afghanistan for this book. The inter-views are the basis of this book. In those interviews where we haveseveral sources for the same vignette or where we have lots ofsupporting written reports and material, we have written the vignettein the third person. In those cases where the person interviewed is theprimary source, we have written the vignette in the first person. Thevignettes are arranged chronologically by type of action. Occasionally,when the actions occur at the same place over time, we lump thoseactions together instead of chronologically. We have tried to make thebook as accurate as possible, but realize that time and retelling mayhave altered some of the facts. We have limited the span of the bookfrom the Soviet invasion until their withdrawal. The war startedbefore the Soviet invasion and continued long after their departure. We plan to write about these battles in a future book. We used edition 2-DMA series U611 1:100,000 maps from the U.S.Defense Mapping Agency for the final preparation of the material.For those who wish to consult the map sheets, map sheet numbersare given with each vignette. We have numbered each vignette within the chapter and started each chapter with a country map showing the rough location of each vignette. The interviews were long andexhaustive, so many details are available. Many of the interviewswere conducted at different times and places, with different peoplewho had been part of the same battle or operation. This allowed usto check and compare details and sequences of events. Map eleva-tions are given in meters. Contour intervals are not consistent andmerely show elevation. Place and name spelling is based on Ali Jalali's best transliteration efforts. Consistency in spelling is difficult when two alphabets are involved—some spellings are different than in other books on Afghanistan. Although the Mujahideen always say 'Russian' instead of 'Soviet', we have used 'Soviet' throughout unless it is a direct quote.
We use Russian map graphics on the maps. The Afghan Army used the Soviet graphics system and most Mujahideen were familiar with them. Russian graphics are more "user friendly" ( flexible and illustrative) than Western graphics. The Russians can show thesequential development of an action by adding times or identifyinglines to their graphics. These lines are explained in the legend. A table of Russian map graphics is located in the back of the book. Mujahideen forces are shown in blue and Soviet/DRA forces are shown in red.
The ambush is a favorite tactic of the guerrilla since it allows him to mass forces covertly, attack the enemy, seize needed supplies and retreat before the enemy can effectively react. The ambush has long been part of the Afghan warrior tradition and has been a key feature of historic Afghan warfare—whether fighting other tribes, the British or the government. The Mujahideen ambush served to attack the Soviet/DRA lines of communication, provided needed supplies, and forced the bulk of Soviet/DRA maneuver forces to perform security missions. Logistics were key to the conduct of the Soviet/Afghan War and Mujahideen ambushes threatened the resupply of Soviet and DRA forces and limited the number of Soviet troops that could be deployed into the country. The Mujahideen ambush was their most effective counter to Soviet/DRA military activity and threatened the ability of the Soviets and DRA to prosecute the war.
VIGNETTE 1: AMBUSHES AT THE MAMUR HOTEL
by Commander Mohammad Akbar
(Mohammad Akbar is from the village of Shahi Kale in Mohammad Agha District of LogarProvince. He graduated from high school in the region and joined the resistance in 1979and fought in Logar Province until the collapse of the DRA. He was a member of the Islamic Party (HIH - Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin). [Map sheet 2885, vic grid 1086].)
A day seldom passed without a clash between the Mujahideen and the Soviets or DRA in Logar Province. In the summer of 1980, my group set an ambush to attack a supply column of Soviet and DRA forces moving from Kabul to Gardez on highway 157. At that time, the populace had not migrated from the area and it was full of people. The Mujahideen had contacts in the government who reported on the movement of columns along the main highway. This was to be our first attack on a major column on this highway following the Soviet invasion. The ambush site was located around the Pul-e Qandahari junction with the main highway. At this point, the Logar River comes within 200 meters of the highway to the east, and the Kuh-e Mohammad Agha hills rise some 700 meters over the highway to the west. Ten kilometers to the south, the road runs through a steep gorge where vehicles cannot easily turn back (Map 1 - Mamur 1). We had 50 Mujahideen armed with Mosin-Nagant carbines, Enfield rifles and two RPG-7s. Our leader, Commander Hayat, divided our men into three groups and put one group in the Bini Sherafghan ruins some 70 meters west of the road. He put the second group to the east of the road around the Mamur Hotel and put the third group to the east in Pul-eQandahari facing the Mohammad Agha High School. Our ambush occupied a two-kilometer stretch. At this time, I was the late Commander Hayat's deputy commander, commanding the Pul-eQandahari positions.
Commander Hayat ordered that the attack would start when the end of the column reached the Bini Shirafghan ruins. The DRA column came. It had about 100 vehicles carrying food, ammunition and fuel. There were quite a few POL tankers in the column. We let it pass and, as the end of the column reached the ruins, we started to attack at the end of the column. In those days, convoy escort was very weak and air support was insufficient. There was practically no resistance or reaction to our attack from the column. Even the APCs which were escorting the column were passive. We left our positions and started moving up the column, firing as we went, and damaged or destroyed almost all the vehicles. We had no casualties. I don't know how many DRA casualties there were, but we wounded many drivers who the government evacuated later. We left the area promptly after the ambush.
The area around the Mamur Hotel was ideal for an ambush and we, and other Mujahideen groups, used it often. In September 1981,we set an ambush at the Mamur Hotel and in Pule-e Qandahari facing the high school. The Mamur Hotel group was commanded by the noted HIH commander Doctor Abdul Wali Khayat and the Pule-Qandahari position was commanded by my commander, the late Commander Hayat. There were some 35 Mujahideen armed with AK-47 rifles and three RPG-7s. The ambush site occupied about one kilometer of road-way. When the column arrived, we destroyed twelve trucks and captured three intact. The three trucks were large, heavy-duty, eight-cylinder trucks and they were loaded with beans, rice and military boots. We needed all this gear. We also captured two 76mm field guns and a heavier gun that I don't know the type or caliber. We did not have any Mujahideen casualties.
In July 1982, the late Doctor Wali Khayat set an ambush near the Mamur Hotel. A Soviet column, moving supplies from Kabul to Gardez, entered the ambush kill zone. During the attack, one Mujahideen fired an RPG-7 at an escorting APC. It hit the APC and a Soviet officer jumped out of the damaged APC and took cover. The officer was wounded. While the fighting was going on, the column sped up and left the ambush area—and left the officer behind. Doctor Abdul Wali Khayat fired at the position where the Soviet officer was. The Soviet officer returned fire with his AK-74. Doctor Khayat fired again and wounded the Soviet officer a second time—this time in the hand. The Soviet officer dropped his AK-74 and took out his pistol. Doctor Khayat threw a hand grenade at the officer and killed him. Then he crossed the road and took his AK-74 and his Makarov pistol. He left the body where it lay and the Mujahideen left the ambush site.
The next day the Soviets returned in a column from Kabul. They cordoned off the area and searched the houses around Mohammad Agha District headquarters and the town of Kotubkhel. They went house to house looking for their missing officer. HIH commander Sameh Jan was in Kotubkhel at that time He coordinated and organized the actions of all the Mujahideen factions which were caught inthe cordon. There were about 150 Mujahideen caught in the cordon.The Mujahideen began attacking the searching Soviets. They launched sudden, surprise attacks in the close streets and alleys of the villages and in the spaces between the villages. The fighting was often at point-blank range. The fighting began in the
