characterized as adisunited land riven by blood feuds. The feuds center on family andQawm. Yet, the leaders of the various Qawm have resolved feuds andheld the land together. Village elders can put feuds on hold for adecade or longer and then let them resume once the agreed-on time hasexpired and the matter is still unresolved. Afghanistan's ancient rootsand strong ties of kinship provide an anchor against progress, but alsothe means to cope when central authority has collapsed. Historically,the collapse of the central government of Afghanistan or the destruc-tion of its standing armies has never resulted in the defeat of thenation by an invader. The people, relying on their decentralized polit-ical, economic and military potential, have always taken over theresistance against the invaders.3 This was the case during two wars with Great Britain in the 19th Century (1839–1842, 1878–1880). This happened again in the Soviet-Afghan War.
The tactics of the Mujahideen reflected this lack of central cohesion. Their tactics were not standard, but differed from valley tovalley and tribe to tribe. No more than 15 percent of the guerrillacommanders were military professionals. However, Afghanistan hada conscript army and virtually every 22-year-old male served his twoyear obligation. This provided a basic military education which easedcooperation between the various Mujahideen groups. The Mujahi-deen were true volunteers—unpaid warriors who fought to protecttheir faith and community first and their nation next. As true vol-unteers, fighting for their Qawm and religion, the Mujahideen lookeddown on the professional soldier (asker) as a simple mercenary whowas either the victim of a press gang or too stupid to ply any othertrade.4 This disdain did not attach to the professional officer, whoenjoyed a great deal of prestige.
Afghanistan was not a guerrilla war ala Mao Tse Tung or VoNguyen Giap. The Mujahideen were not trying to force a new ideolo-gy and government on a land. Rather, they fought to defend theirQawm and their religion against a hostile ideology, an atheistic value 2 ibid,3. 3 ibid,4. 4 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994,page 158–159. xiv system, an oppressive central government and a foreign invader. Itwas a spontaneous defense of community values and a traditional wayof life by individual groups initially unconnected to national or inter-national political organizations.5 The Great Game 6 Russian expansionism and empire building in Central Asia beganin 1734 and Moscow's interest in Afghanistan was apparent by the late1830s. The Great Game described the British and Russian struggle forinfluence along the unsettled northern frontier of British India and inthe entire region between Russia and India. Afghanistan lay directlyin this contested area between two empires. Russia described hermotives in the Great Game as simply to abolish the slave trade and toestablish order and control along her southern border. The British,however, viewing Russian absorption of the lands of the Caucasus,Georgia, Khirgiz, Turkmens, Khiva and Bukhara, claimed to feelthreatened by the presence of a large, expanding empire near Indiaand ascribed different Russian motives. The British stated thatRussian motives were to weaken British power and to gain access to awarm-water port. Britain claimed that her own actions were to protectthe frontiers of British India.
The Great Game spilled into Afghanistan when British forcesinvaded during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842). Britainclaimed that the invasion was supposed to counter Russian influence.After hard fighting, the British withdrew. By 1869, the Russianempire reached the banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus) river—the north- .ern border of Afghanistan. This caused additional British concern. In1878, the arrival of a special Russian diplomatic mission to Kabul ledto another British invasion and the Second Anglo-Afghan War. TheBritish Army again withdrew. In the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907,the Russians agreed that Afghanistan lay outside its sphere of inter-est and agreed to confer with Britain on all matters relating toRussian-Afghan relations. In return, Britain agreed not to occupy orannex any part of Afghanistan nor interfere in the internal affairs ofthat country. Although the Amir of Afghanistan refused to recognizethe treaty, Russia and Britain agreed to its terms and honored them 5 Jalali,1 6 Section derived from Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins (editors), Afghanistan: ACountry Study, Fifth edition, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1986, 22–73 andPeter Hopkirk, The Great Game, New York: Kodansha International, 1994. XV until 1919 when Afghan troops crossed into British India, seized avillage and attempted to raise a popular revolt in the area. TheBritish responded with yet another invasion and the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The political settlement resulted in Afghanistan's fullindependence from Great Britain. Afghanistan's foreign policy from 1919 until 1978 balanced thedemands of her immediate neighbors, and external powers such as theUnited States, Germany and Great Britain. Normal relations with hernorthern neighbor, the Soviet Union, led to increased Soviet invest-ment and presence in Afghanistan.
In April 1978, a small leftist group of Soviet-trained Afghan officersseized control of the government and founded the Democratic Republicof Afghanistan, a client state of the Soviet Union. Civil war broke outin Afghanistan. The putsch installed President Nur M. Taraki, aMarxist who announced sweeping programs of land distribution,changed status for women and the destruction of the old Afghanistansocial structure. Disregarding the national social structure and mores,the new government enjoyed little popular support. The wobbly Tarakigovernment was almost immediately met by increased armed resis-tance as the Mujahideen ranks grew. In 1978, religious leaders, inresponse to popular uprisings across Afghanistan, issued statements ofjihad (holy war) against the communist regime. This was an appeal to the supranational identity of all Afghans--a fight to defend the faith ofIslam. The combat readiness of the Army of the Democratic Republicof Afghanistan plunged as government purges swept the officer corps.Soldiers, units and entire regiments deserted to the resistance and bythe end of 1979, the actual strength of the Afghan Army was less thanhalf of its authorized 90,000. In March 1979, the city of Herat revolt-ed and most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joinedthe rebellion. Forces loyal to Taraki reoccupied the city after theAfghan Air Force bombed the city and the 17th Division. Thousands ofpeople reportedly died in the fighting, including some Soviet citizens.
Soviet Intervention
The Soviet-Afghan War began over the issue of control. TheDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan was nominally a socialist stategoverned by a communist party. However, the state only controlledsome of the cities, while tribal elders and clan chiefs controlled thecountryside. Furthermore, the communist party of Afghanistan wassplit into two hostile factions. The factions spent more time fighting each other than trying to establish socialism in Afghanistan. InSeptember 1979, Taraki's Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, seizedpower and murdered Taraki. Amin's rule proved no better and theSoviet Union watched this new communist state spin out of control.Meanwhile, units of the army mutinied, civil war broke out, cities andvillages rose in revolt and Afghanistan began to slip away fromMoscow's control and influence. Leonid Brezhnev, the aged SovietGeneral Secretary, saw that direct military intervention was the onlyway to prevent his client state from disintegrating into complete chaos.He decided to intervene.
The obvious models for intervention were Hungary in 1956 andCzechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet General Staff planned theAfghanistan invasion based on these models. However, there was asignificant difference that the Soviet planners missed. Afghanistanwas embroiled in a civil war and a coup de main would only gaincontrol of the central government, not the countryside. Althoughparticipating military units were briefed at the last minute, the SovietChristmas Eve invasion of 1979 was masterfully planned and well-executed. The Soviets seized the government, killed the president andput their own man in his place. According to some Russian sources,they planned to stabilize the situation, strengthen the army and thenwithdraw the majority of Soviet forces within three years. The SovietGeneral Staff planned to leave all fighting in the hands of the army ofthe Democratic Republic. But Afghanistan was in full revolt, thedispirited Afghan army was unable to cope, and the specter of defeatfollowing a Soviet withdrawal haunted the. Politburo. Invasion andoverthrow of the government proved much easier than fighting thehundreds of ubiquitous guerrilla groups. The Soviet Army wastrained for large-scale, rapid-tempo operations. They were nottrained for the platoon leaders' war of finding and closing with small,indigenous forces which would only stand and fight when the terrainand circumstances
