The Power In The Land. Fred Harrison

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The Power In The Land - Fred Harrison

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disturbed them from some normal level of activity can be ascribed, in the main, to external influences over which there was no control. Hunter-gatherers may have gone hungry at times because the herds failed to return to the traditional grazing grounds. In agrarian systems, famines occurred because of inclement weather. This is not to deny that problems did not originate from within the system. Over-zealous hunting can deplete the available stock of animals in a tribe’s territory; over-intensive cultivation can turn soil into a dust bowl. But these were aberrations, cases of unwise, irregular, self-destructive, management of affairs by individuals, and were not entailed by the mode of production itself.

      Because these systems were stable, over very long periods of time, scholars classified them as ‘stagnant’ societies. But the peoples themselves were content. They were culturally equipped to deal with deviant cases within their ranks, and they developed elaborate rituals to explain, if not to control, the ‘acts of god’.

      Industrial society, by contrast, has in its short life been riddled with regular economic crises which appear to be caused directly by malfunctioning elements of the system itself. If the record is to be believed, capitalism suffers from internal contradictions which preclude stable production of goods and services over a long period of time.

      There have been many theoretical attempts from the time of Marx to Keynes to explain why the modern industrial economy staggers from one recession to another with the predictability of the seasons. All the variables — trends in national income, consumption of durable goods, fresh formation of fixed capital, phases in the innovation of consumer goods and processes of production — have been scrutinized in the search for the cause of trade cycles. Most of these attempts are of a descriptive rather than explanatory character.

      With the fall from popularity of the Keynesian doctrine — the tools of which failed to assist the politicians to prevent or even to ameliorate the recession which struck the capitalist West in the 1970s — there has been a hiatus in public policy formation. In desperation, there has been a fail-back to simplistic ‘solutions’ like the monetarism which found popularity in Britain in the early 1980s. These, however, have been attempts at sitting tight in the hope of happier days to come, relying on the principles of sound budgeting for individual households rather than for nations.

      George was not satisfied with conventional ‘explanations’. How could it be, he wondered, that there was ‘under-consumption’ when people were hungry, poorly clothed, badly housed? They were willing to consume more — what stopped them? And how could it be that there was ‘over-production’ by capitalists who were supposed to be in search of profits? Supply might be larger than demand for a particular product at a given moment in time; but what stopped the entrepreneur from cutting his price, selling off his goods and smoothly moving into a more profitable field of activity?

      George concluded that land monopoly was to blame. It operated at two different levels of intensity. Speculation caused depressions by enabling people to demand prices which were extraordinarily high: effectively, the monopolists demanded a part of tomorrow's output today. The effect of this is to milk the returns to capital and/or labour. But this can only be tolerated up to a point, beyond which it becomes uneconomic to employ either capital or labour; unemployment ensues. Secondly, land monopoly enables speculators to hold land idle in the expectation of future capital gains. This is the wait-and-see strategy. As a result, scarce land is withheld from production in itself preventing new employment — and as a consequence of the contraction in supply, this pushes up the level of rents of land in use. This has the effect of bankrupting some firms which would otherwise be profitable and competitive.

      This produces ‘a partial disjointing of production and exchange’, which manifests itself in apparent over-production and under-consumption. A decline in output continues until one or a combination of three things happens:

      (1) the speculative advance in rents terminates;

      (2) an increase in the efficiency of capital and/or labour results in an increase of income and a readjustment of the distribution in relative shares going to the factors of production; or

      (3) labour and capital reconcile themselves to lower returns in wages and interest.

      Henry George provided an account of how recessions cause the collapse of banks, the bankruptcy of firms and the panic of speculators who find that they have to finance loans at high interest rates for land which is suddenly seen to be over-valued. He used largely impressionistic evidence to support his theory. For this he cannot be criticised, for it is only in recent years that statisticians have produced data in anything like sufficient quantity and quality to enable us to elaborate the theory in a scientific

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