Of the LAW of NATIONS.
CHAP. I. Concerning the natural and social state of man, from page 1. to page 18. with a supplement to page 23. in vindication of the constitution of things as they relate to mankind; and concerning the method of determining all questions about the duties of societies to societies.
CHAP. II. Of the duties belonging to the matrimonial state or society, to page 44.
CHAP. III. Of the duties that belong to parents and children, to page 63.
CHAP. IV. Concerning the duties belonging to masters and servants, to page 73.
CHAP. V. Of the complex society called a family, and the duties to be observed in it, to page 80. with a supplement in answer to those who derive absolute monarchy from family government, the origins of civil government, to page 85.
CHAP. VI. Of the origine of civil society, its constitution, qualities, or properties, to page 109. with a supplement, containing remarks on the natural causes of government, and of changes in government, to page 119.
CHAP. VII. Of sovereignty, and the ways of acquiring it, with notes interspersed relative to the measures of submission to civil government, to page 145. with a supplement to shew the true end of civil government, and to vindicate mankind from the aspersion of their being incapable of government truly equal, to page 150.
CHAP. VIII. Concerning the immanent rights of majesty, and the just exercise of them, to page 184.
CHAP. IX. Concerning the transeunt rights of majesty, to page 214.
CHAP. X. Of the duties of subjects, to page 222.
With a supplement concerning the duties of magistrates and subjects, to which are prefixed some observations on the study of the laws of nature and nations, to page 247.
To all which is added a discourse on the nature and origine of moral and civil laws, in which moral and civil laws are deduced, in the experimental way, by an analysis of human nature, from our internal dispositions and principles, and our situation.
THE LAWS OF
NATURE and NATIONS deduced, & C.
BOOK I
Of the LAW of NATURE
Concerning the origine and foundation of the LAW of NATURE and NATIONS.
SECTION I
What constitutes a good, and what a bad action?
Whatever tends to preserve and perfect man is called good with respect to man: whatever hath a contrary tendency is called ill with regard to him:* every action therefore which contributes to human preservation and perfection is a good action; and every action is evil which tends to hurt and destroy man, or to hinder his advancement to the perfection of which his nature is capable.
SECTION II
What Preservation and perfection mean, and what destruction and imperfection?
Whatever conduces in any manner or degree towards our duration, or the continuance of our present state, is said to be preservative of man: whatever promotes and augments those properties, which belonging to human nature, and constituting our state and rank, admits of degrees, is called perfective of man.* Whence it is easy to under-<2>stand what may be said to hurt, wrong, or degrade us.
SECTION III
Men have power to act well or ill.
Such being the nature of human will, that it always desires good, and abhors ill;† it cannot but like those actions which tend to our preservation and perfection, and it cannot but dislike those actions which tend to our hurt and imperfection: But because good and ill may be really what they appear to be, and on the other hand, a seeming good may be a real evil, and a seeming evil may be a real good;† it very often happens, that like Ixion in the fable, we embrace an empty cloud instead of Juno;1i.e. we are deceived by appearances, and mistake seeming for solid good, and a false semblance of ill for real ill; and thus we may make a bad or a good choice, be right or wrong in our elections, and consequently in our actions.†
SECTION IV
Wherefore men stand in need of some rule by which they may direct their actions.
Now the power of preferring one or other of two possibles, and by consequence of acting well or ill, is called liberty: this power we experience; wherefore it cannot be denied that there are, with regard to us, free actions which are good, and free actions which are bad. But since all things, which may be <3> rightly directed or perverted, stand in need of a rule by which they may be rightly directed, it follows that our free actions ought to be directed by some rule.*
SECTION V
And this rule must be right or just, sure and immutable.
By a rule here we understand an evident criterion by which good and ill may be certainly distinguished. And in order to answer that end, a rule must be true, right or just, clear, certain and constant. For suppose the rule not to be just, and that which is ruled by it will not be just or right. Suppose it not to be clear and certain, and it cannot be a sure criterion of good and evil. Finally, if we suppose it to be uncertain and variable, an action regulated by it will sometimes be good and sometimes be bad: and therefore in none of these cases would it deserve the name of a rule.†
SECTION VI
It must likewise be obligatory.
Further, a rule of action would be but of little advantage to mankind, if it were not of such a kind, <4> that it carried with it some motive (as it is called) by which human will might be impelled to make use of it, and apply it. Because man never acts without something present to his mind, by which he is excited or impelled to act; he will therefore not apply a rule, or at least he will be very indifferent whether he applies it or no, unless he be stimulated by some motive to apply it. But since we call the connection between a motive and a free action obligation, that a rule for the direction of human actions may answer its end, it must be obligatory.
SECTION VII
What is obligation, and how many kinds of it are there?
Obligation
