is the faculty by which the mind perceives, judges, and reasons. When this faculty takes the name of imagination, we have sufficiently shewn in another treatise, (in the elements of rational philosophy).
SECTION XXXII
Without its concurrence an action is not moral.
But since the will cannot exert itself, unless it be excited by the understanding, (§30) it follows <23> that it cannot prefer a just action as such, nor abhor an unjust one as such, unless the understanding hath first distinctly perceived the action to be just or unjust, by comparing it with the rule of action, i.e. by reasoning. And therefore moral actions presuppose the capacity of perceiving a rule of action, and of comparing actions with the ideas of just and unjust.*
SECTION XXXIII
Hence conscience.
That faculty by which we reason about the goodness or pravity of our actions is called conscience, concerning which we have discoursed at large in another treatise. Here however it is necessary to repeat, or rather add some observations upon conscience.
SECTION XXXIV
Which is reasoning.
Because conscience reasons concerning the goodness and pravity of actions; (§33) but actions are called just, in respect of an external obligation arising from a law; conscience must therefore compare the one with the other, the law and the fact; that is, form two propositions, and from them deduce a third; which, since it cannot be done but by syllogism, it follows that every reasoning of <24> conscience is a syllogism, consisting of three propositions, the law, the action, and the conclusion.†
SECTION XXXV
It is divided into good and evil conscience.
Since conscience in its reasonings always terminates in a sentence which it draws (§34): but every sentence either condemns or absolves according as the action is found to be conformable or disagreable to the law. Conscience, when it absolves, is called good, and when it condemns, it is called evil; the former is attended with tranquillity and confidence; the latter with suspiciousness and dread.*
SECTION XXXVI
It is likewise divided into antecedent and consequent.
We may reason either about past or future actions, and therefore conscience reasoning about actions not yet performed, is called antecedent conscience, and when it reasons about actions already done, it is called consequent conscience.
SECTION XXXVII
In some persons both are found.
In both cases conscience compares the action with the law. But because the good and upright man, <25> who hath a due sense of virtue and duty alone sets himself to conform his future actions to the divine law; such only exercise antecedent conscience. The consequent exerts itself even in the breasts of the most profligate.†
SECTION XXXVIII
Conscience either excites, admonishes, or reclaims.
Further, as often as we compare a future action with the law, we find it either to be commanded, forbidden, or permitted. In the first case conscience excites us to perform the action. In the second it restrains us from it. In the third, having wisely examined all its circumstances, it advises what ought to be done. Conscience is therefore divided into exciting, restraining, and admonishing.* <26>
SECTION XXXIX
Conscience is either right or erroneous.
Moreover, because conscience is a reasoning, the same things agree to it which are true of a syllogism; wherefore as reasoning, so conscience may be either right or erroneous; and as every reasoning is either faulty in the form or in the matter, so conscience errs, either because the law, or because the action is not rightly represented; or because the rules of just reasoning are not observed.†
SECTION XL
It is either certain or probable.
Again, as in other reasonings, so likewise in those of conscience chiefly, it happens that an argument is sometimes taken from a certain principle, and sometimes from an hypothesis, a probable proposition, but yet merely hypothetical. Hence conscience is called certain, when it argues upon an indisputable law; and probable, when it founds upon the probable opinion of others.* Now, because there are various degrees of probability, conscience must sometimes be more, and sometimes less probable. <27>
SECTION XLI
What doubtful and scrupulous conscience mean?
Because what is probable may be true, or may be false (§40): therefore it happens that probable arguments present themselves to us on both sides of the question; now in this case we think more deliberation is required, the affair being dubious; and conscience is then said to be doubtful; but if the perplexity we are in, and cannot get totally rid of, be of smaller consequence, it is then called scrupulous.* <28>
SECTION XLII
What free and less free conscience mean?
Besides, it may happen that the mind, precipitated into vice by impetuous appetites, and as it were enslaved by evil habits, is not able to reason freely about actions; but is strongly biassed towards the side of its passions; in which servile state conscience is not a free and impartial reasoner. But the mind which hath delivered itself from such miserable bondage into a state of liberty is free. This distinction is accurately explained by Wolfius ’s Ethic. §84.†1
SECTION XLIII
What sleeping, awakened and seared conscience mean?
We know by experience that men are sometimes lulled so fast asleep by their vices, that they have no feeling of their misery, and never think upon duty, or right and wrong. Now, as we then say, conscience is in a deep lethargy; or if it is, by a long habit of vice, become quite obdurate and <29> callous, we say it is seared as with a burning iron.* So conscience seems as it were to awake, when a person rouzed by calamity, or a sense of danger, begins to examine and ponder his actions with some attention, and to reflect and reason about their goodness or depravity.
SECTION XLIV
What is meant by quiet, disturbed, anxious, disquieted conscience and remorse?
We have already remarked that every one’s conscience condemns or absolves him (§35): but because absolution must be accompanied with the highest satisfaction of mind, and condemnation with the bitterest uneasiness and disquiet; hence it follows, that a good conscience, acting upon certain evidence, is for the most part quiet and easy; an evil conscience is disturbed by racking remorse; (which torment the antients compared to the burning torches of the furies): and a dubious one is very anxious and restless, to such a degree, that it knows not to what hand to turn itself. These affections however belong more properly to the effects of conscience than to conscience itself, as every one will immediately perceive.* <30>
SECTION XLV
Whether
