repugnant to that eternal law in any respect; and much less can any among mortals arrogate to himself any power over that law.*
SECTION XVIII
The difference between the law of nature and civil law.
Nor will it now be difficult to find out the difference between the law of nature and civil law. For the former is discovered by right reason, the latter is promulgated and made known either viva voce or by writing. The former extends as far as right reason: the other is the law of a particular state: The former hath for its object all actions internal as well as external, which are by nature good or evil: The other respects indifferent and ex-<13>ternal actions, so far only as the good of any people or state requires their regulation and adjustment.†
SECTION XIX
The knowledge of it is of great utility with respect to civil law.
But notwithstanding this difference, it is beyond all doubt, that the knowledge of the law of nature must be of the greatest use to all who apply themselves to the study of the civil law; because many of its precepts are adopted by civil law, and by it are fortified with additional penalties;* several conclusions are drawn from the law of nature by civil law; and natural equity must never be severed from civil law, lest according to the ancient saying, Strict law become severe injustice. Summum jus summa injuria. <14>
SECTION XX
The brutes are not governed by the law of nature.
Moreover from the same principle it is visible, that no other creatures besides men are subject to this law; since God hath dignified man alone with the prerogative of reason; and therefore that definition of Ulpian is false. Natural law is a law which nature hath taught all animals. L. 1. §3. Dig. de just. & jure.*
SECTION XXI
What is called the law of nations?
Further, since the law of nature comprehends all the laws promulgated to mankind by right reason; and men may be considered either as particulars singly, or as they are united in certain political bodies or societies; we call that law, by which the actions of particulars ought to be governed, the law of nature, and we call that the law of nations, which determines what is just and unjust in society or between societies. And therefore the precepts, the laws of both are the same; nay, the law of nations is the law of nature it self, respecting or applied to social life and the affairs of societies and independent states.† <15>
SECTION XXII
Whether it be different from the law of nature?
Hence we may infer, that the law of nature doth not differ from the law of nations, neither in respect of its foundation and first principles, nor of its rules, but solely with regard to its object. Wherefore their opinion is groundless, who speak of, I know not what, law of nations distinct from the law of nature. The positive or secondary law of nations devised by certain ancients, does not properly belong to that law of nations we are now to treat of, because it is neither established by God, nor promulgated by right reason; it is neither common to all mankind nor unchangeable.*
SECTION XXIII
This work divided into two parts.
It will not therefore be an useless attempt to treat of both these laws, which have the same foundation <16> in the same work, in such a manner however, as carefully to distinguish the one from the other, since they differ from one another in respect of their objects and application. We shall therefore handle them separately in this order; in the first book, we shall enquire into the law of nature; and in the second, into the law of nations.
REMARKS on This Chapter
Tho’ our Author proceeds more distinctly and methodically than most other writers on the law of nature and nations, yet some steps of the reasoning of this chapter do not intirely satisfy me. For §8. he reasons thus, “A rule carrying along with it no more than internal obligation would be uncertain, and so would not deserve the name of a rule; because internal obligation only means the intrinsic goodness of an action, but man is so framed that he may mistake seeming for real good.”—Whence he concludes §9. “That no rule can be certain, and thus sufficient for our direction, but that which carries along with it an external obligation, i.e. according to his definition, the command of a superior invested with sufficient power to enforce his commands.” Now it is plain, that the command of God to do, or to forbear an action can only be inferred from the intrinsic goodness or pravity of that action, i.e. in our author’s language, the external obligation of an action can only be inferred from its internal obligation. Our author acknowledges this §5, and afterwards §60, and §77, & seq. But this being true, it evidently follows, That we cannot be more certain about the external obligation of an action, than we are about its internal obligation: whatever uncertainty our apprehensions of the latter are liable to, our apprehensions of the former must be liable to the same uncertainty. It appears to me very odd reasoning to say, That considering how obnoxious men are to mistakes about good and evil, there must be a more certain rule for human conduct than the intrinsic goodness of actions, even the divine will; when at the same time we are told, that we cannot come at the knowledge of the divine will with respect to our conduct, otherwise than by first knowing what an action is in itself; or that we can only infer the divine will concerning an action from its intrinsic nature, its intrinsic goodness or pravity. In order to cut off many verbal disputes, with which the moral science hath been hitherto perplexed in its very first steps, it ought in my opinion to set out in this manner. 1. If there be such a thing as good or evil belonging to, or arising from actions, there is an internal obligation or a sufficient reason to choose the one and to abhor the other. But that some actions are good and others evil, must be true if preservation and destruction, pain <17> and pleasure, happiness and misery, perfection and imperfection, be not words without meaning, which will not be said. This is the substance of what our author says in his first section, and thus the better antients deduced and explained the essential differences of actions, or the natural difference betwixt virtue and vice. See my Principles of moral and christian philosophy, T. 1. c. 5. t. 2. §3. introduction. In other words, if there be any such thing as natural good and evil, there must be moral good and evil; for actions tending to good must be good, and actions tending to evil must be evil; or if there be any such thing as perfection and imperfection with respect to any quality, any being, as a vine, a horse, &c. there must likewise be such a thing as perfection and imperfection with respect to moral powers and moral agents and their acts or exertions. 2. If there be a God, he must will that we should regulate our actions by, and act conformably to the internal obligation of actions. But that there is a God is the universal plain language of nature. 3. Wherefore wherever there is internal obligation to act in such or such a manner, there is likewise an external obligation to act in the same manner, i.e. there is an extrinsic reason for acting so, arising from the will of God, who is infinitely perfect, and upon whom all our interests here and hereafter absolutely depend. 4. Whatever therefore in respect of its internal obligation may be called a proper rule of conduct, is at the same time a law, in the proper and strict sense of the word, i.e. it is the will, the command of a superior who hath right to command, and power to enforce the obedience of his commands, being the will of God the creator. 5. A system of rules or of directions for our conduct, having internal obligation, may be properly called a system of laws, of natural laws, of divine laws, because it is a system of precepts discoverable from their natural fitness, or internal obligation to be the will or laws of God concerning our conduct. And therefore the whole enquiry into rules of moral conduct, may be called an enquiry into the natural laws of God concerning our conduct.
It is not properly the business of such an enquiry to prove the being of
