is a connection between motives and free actions, (§6) and motives must consist either in the intrinsic goodness and pravity of actions themselves, or arise from the will of some Being whose authority we acknowledge, commanding and forbidding certain actions under a penalty. And therefore the former species of obligation is called internal; the latter is called external.* The first excites to good actions, the other to just actions. But right is the correlate (as it is called in the schools) to both. For if one person be under an obligation, some other person hath a right or title to exact something from him.
SECTION VIII
Internal obligation is not sufficient.
Hence it is manifest, that a rule which carries only an internal obligation with it, is not sufficient with respect to mankind: for since this obligation solely arises from the goodness of the action, (§7), and therefore only excites a person to act by this motive, viz. that his action may be good; but man is so framed by nature, that he often embraces a false appearance of good for what is really such:* (§3). Such a rule must be uncertain, and for that reason it is not deserving of being called a rule (§5). <5>
SECTION IX
An external obligation either perfect or imperfect is therefore wanting.
But if a rule only carrying an internal obligation with it, would be uncertain, there is need of one which may produce an external obligation arising from the will of some Being whose authority we acknowledge. Since therefore that Being may oblige us to the practice of virtue and honesty, either without co-action, or may command and forbid certain actions with penalties and rewards, the former species of external obligation is properly denominated imperfect, and the latter perfect. Now the will of a superior commanding and forbidding under penalty is called a law: and therefore a rule for the direction of our free actions, to conform to which we are under perfect obligation, must consist of laws, and a system of such is termed by way of eminence law.* <6>
SECTION X
Of this law there can be no other author but God.
Now, since that Being may be justly denominated our superior, upon whom our being and happiness absolutely depend, and whose authority we are obliged to acknowledge, because he has a just title to exact obedience from us, and hath power to propose penalties to us in case of our refusing to obey him; and, it appears by many most evident arguments, that he never hath renounced, nor never can renounce his authority to rule and command us:† That superior Being whose authority we are obliged to acknowledge, can be no other than the most great and good God; and he therefore is the sole author of that law, which ought, as we have said, to be the rule of action to all mankind. <7>
SECTION XI
This law is made known to mankind in no other way but by reason.
Because we are enquiring, as appears from what hath been said, for no other rule of right but what <8> God hath given to the whole human race for the rule of their conduct, (§10) hence it follows that this rule must be intelligible to all mankind. But since what is intelligible to, or may be known by all mankind, must be discovered to them either by a divine revelation, which all men acknowledge and receive as such, or must be discoverable by the use of natural reason; because such a revelation as hath been mentioned never existed: it is obvious that the law of nature must mean laws within the discovery of all mankind by the use of reason common to all mankind, and which therefore are by nature promulgated to all mankind.*
SECTION XII
A definition of the law of nature and of jurisprudence, natural or divine.
The law of nature, or the natural rule of rectitude, is a system of laws promulgated by the eternal God to the whole human race by reason. But if you would rather consider it as a science, na-<9>tural morality will be rightly defined the practical habit of discovering the will of the supreme legislator by reason, and of applying it as a rule to every particular case that occurs. Now, because it consists in deducing and applying a rule coming from God, it may be justly called divine jurisprudence.
SECTION XIII
The law of nature may be divided into preceptive and permissive.
Since the law of nature is a system of laws (§12) whatever properly belongs to laws may be ascribed to the law of nature, as to prohibit, permit, punish.* It may be divided as a body of laws is by the Roman lawyers into the permissive part, which obliges all men not to disturb any person in the use and exercise of his right and liberty; and the preceptive, which obliges all men to do good actions, and to abstain from bad ones; and it is also evident, that with respect to the preceptive part, there is no liberty left to mankind; whereas, with regard to the permissive, any one may renounce his right to what is permitted to him.* <10>
SECTION XIV
Whether would there be a law of nature if there were no God?
Now seeing the law of nature comes from God (§12) as the supreme legislator, it follows by consequence, that tho’ a person may do a good action, without any regard to the law of nature as such, being excited to it by the internal goodness or obligation of the action, and by his good disposition; tho’ even an atheist, who hath no sense of religion, may do a good action thro’ the influence and guidance of his reason, because he knows it to be good in itself, and advantageous to him; yet such a person cannot on that account be said to act justly, i.e. conformably to the law of nature considered as such; much less then can it be said, that there would still be a law of nature,* tho’ it should be granted, which cannot be done without impiety, that there were no God, or that God did not take any care of human affairs. See Grotius proleg. jur. belli & pacis, §xi.
SECTION XV
Why it is said to be inscribed on our hearts.
Since the rule of rectitude we are now speaking of signifies laws promulgated by right reason, <11> (§12) and reason is nothing else but the faculty of reasoning, or of inferring one truth from others by necessary consequence,* it is therefore plain why the apostle affirms that the knowledge of this rule is engraved on our hearts, Rom. ii. 15. For he attributes to man the power or faculty of reasoning concerning just and unjust; which power, since it does not necessarily include in it actual exercise, why some should ascribe even to infants a certain innate sense of just and unjust, is not difficult to be comprehended.
SECTION XVI
Whether the knowledge of it is derived from the sacred writings or tradition?
Hence it follows that the law of nature is not derived from the sacred writings, nor from any divine positive laws, such as the seven precepts given to Noah, of which the Jews boast so much;† tho’ at the same time we readily grant, that the author of reason and revelation being the same, not only many things which reason dictates are to be found in the sacred writings, but there is every where a perfect harmony between them; nor can there indeed be any thing forbidden or commanded in the sacred oracles which is repugnant to the rule of right discoverable by reason. <12>
SECTION XVII
The law of nature is immutable.
Further, from the same principle it is evident that the law of nature is no less immutable than right reason it self, which cannot but remain unchangeably the same: and therefore God, who cannot do any thing contrary to his will,
