1935. Armament consisted of four 4.7-inch Mk IX guns in single mounts and eight 0.5-inch Vickers machine guns in quad mounts in addition to eight torpedo tubes (in quad mounts) and one rack for twenty depth-charges. Maximum speed exceeded 35 knots. (Crown Copyright)
Three single-reduction steam turbines provided 42,000 horsepower to two shafts. Endurance was 3,400 miles at 15 knots, or 5,340 miles at 12.5 knots. The early ships carried 4-inch guns while the later versions were upgraded with 4.7-inch guns. The elevated forecastle and bridge well aft gave the nimble ships good sea-keeping abilities. Efficient fire control was ensured by a 10-foot base rangefinder and the new ‘Destroyer Director Control Tower’ (DCT). Anti-aircraft (A/A) defences were insufficient, though: initally only two quadruple 0.5-inch machine guns abreast the bridge and some 0.303 Lewis guns. Two quadruple torpedo mountings for 21-inch torpedoes were standard for the early ships, while quintuple mountings were introduced for the later classes.9 In 1934 Esk and Empress were completed as minelayers and used for testing. In spite of increased vibrations and some stability issues, the concept was found acceptable. Ships of the subsequent G-, H- and I-classes were designed for, but not fitted out with, minelaying capacity.
The building of ‘super-destroyers’ in other navies made the Admiralty worry over the relative inferiority of the standard British destroyer, and in the late 1930s the Tribal-class was developed. Arguably an unnecessary concept, the Tribals were formidable warships and among the finest-looking vessels the Royal Navy ever possessed. With even better sea-keeping qualities than the smaller destroyers and armed with four twin 4.7-inch turrets, they would be a match for many light cruisers, all the more so as power ramming of the ammunition meant that a high rate of fire could be kept up in rough seas.10 The 4.7-inch guns had a maximum elevation of only 40 degrees, however, and with insufficient A/A armament, one four-barrel pompom and two quadruple machine guns they would suffer heavily when exposed to the dive-bombers of the Luftwaffe. Still, the Tribals, of which the first, Cossack, was commissioned in June 1938, would have an outstanding war record.
In 1936, the Board of the Admiralty, after discussions with fleet officers, decided there was a justifiable requirement for a destroyer, smaller than the Tribal-class, but still armed with a 4.7-inch twin-mounting high-angle/low-angle (HA/LA) gun, two torpedo mountings and minesweeping gear.11 The result was the highly successful J-, K- and N-classes of, in all, twenty-four ships. The first two flotilla leaders, Jervis and Kelly, were completed in May and August 1939, respectively. By the end of 1939, all sixteen J- and K-class destroyers were in service. As with the Tribals, the A/A armament was inadequate and had to be upgraded once the war commenced.12
The myriad of auxiliaries, minesweepers and other small vessels that had been commissioned during WWI were largely put in the reserve, sold or scrapped. The most modern ships were kept, meaning that newbuilds were not even considered before the late 1920s, by which time financial constraints applied. By 1926–27, fourteen vessels of a ‘sloop’ type were included in the building programme for the years 1927–30. In spite of their classification, they were essentially multi-purpose minesweepers equipped for escort and patrol duties and anti-submarine (A/S) work. As usual, when trying to put too many functions on one keel, none worked very well. Too slow for A/S work, too large for efficient mine-sweeping and too weakly armed for patrol duties, the ships were nevertheless complicated in design and needed time and resources to build. From minor differences, they were known as Bridgewater-, Hastings- and Shoreham-classes. The subsequent Grimsby- and Halcyon-classes were simpler, but not necessarily more suitable for wartime service. By 1936, eight Grimsbys and eighteen Halcyons had been built. Later, the Bridgewaters, Hastings, Shorehams and Grimsbys were reclassified as patrol sloops and even later as escort vessels, while the Halcyons became minesweepers. All forty vessels were first and foremost minesweepers, though.13
Sloop Dundee was launched in 1932. She was torpedoed and sunk in September 1940 by U48, which was at the time under the command of Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Bleichrodt (see Chapter 12). (Author’s collection)
From 1936 to 1938 the Naval Staff construction programmes were chiefly concerned with larger vessels – destroyers and above. As war did not appear imminent, the focus was on traditional larger ships, tying up large amounts of resources. There would, it was expected, be sufficient time to fill in the gaps with smaller ships later, should tension increase. When Parliament cut the navy estimates in 1938, the decision was made to maintain cruiser and capital ship programmes and push the smaller ships even further into the future. Instead, arrangements were made for some 200 trawlers to be made ready for rapid conversion to auxiliaries, should necessity dictate. In addition, specifications were prepared whereby further auxiliary minesweepers of trawler design could be built at regular shipyards should the need arise. In early 1939, the first of these ‘Admiralty trawlers’ were ordered. Pending their completion, twenty-six commercial trawlers were bought and put into the yards for conversion. Fifteen of these were ready for service on 3 September 1939.14
Limited in relative and absolute strength, the Royal Navy of the early 1930s was no longer the battle-hardened senior service of Admiral Beatty that had watched the German Hochsee Flotte sail into internment.15 The military historian Correlli Barnett argues that ‘once again a kind of fashionable yacht-club more apt for elegant displays of ship-handling and royal tours of the Empire than for battle’ had emerged.16 In a meeting of the Committee on Defence Programmes, held on 20 March 1939, there seems to have been contentment with the 200 or more ships under construction and no immediate urgency to accelerate the building programme in a systematic manner. ‘A little of everything’ seemed to be the solution, in spite of the meeting admitting to the ‘completely inadequate number of A/S escorts [and] minesweepers’.17
In all fairness, a good number of the officers and sailors strove to maintain the quality of the old navy, but peacetime routines and a return to a Victorian-style social divide between the decks created challenges. Neither the Admiralty nor the naval educational institutions were devoting much time to systematically gathering, analysing and applying the lessons of WWI into the development of new and modified strategies, tactics or doctrines for the next conflict. An alarming number of deficiencies would be brought along into the opening stages of WWII and cost many lives.
Marine Nationale
The French Navy or Marine Nationale of the late 1930s was steeped in tradition, conservative in utilisation of new technologies and limited in individual opportunities. Still, it was large and modern, 200 ships being commissioned between 1920 and 1935, averaging around thirty thousand tons per year. After the collapse of the disarmament talks during the mid-1930s, the building accelerated even more. Except for five renovated capital ships, the oldest ship of the Marine Nationale was seventeen years old in 1939. At the outbreak of WWII the Marine Nationale was the fourth largest navy in the world, and in Europe it was second only to the Royal Navy. It could muster about 160,000 men and was far better prepared for war than either the French Army or the French Air Force.18
For most French naval officers, WWI had been spent escorting convoys to and from the colonies and lying in wait for the Austro-Hungarian fleet that never emerged from its anchorages. Little had come out of the alliance with Britain, and animosity towards the Royal Navy existed well into the 1930s. Students at the Naval Academy (École de Guerre Navale) learned that the Marine Nationale’s main task was to uphold and defend the ports and coastlines of France and its colonies and to protect the merchant routes. Unless absolute surprise and numerical dominance could be achieved, the fleet should not be deployed aggressively. The Washington Naval Treaty was seen as favouring Britain, the USA and Japan while curbing France and Italy, and its restrictions were taken lightly. The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement underpinned the belief that
