other Latin countries. The strategies and mentalities of the French Navy were not primed for cooperation with the Royal Navy.19
Vice-Amiral François Darlan, who took over as Chief of Staff on 1 January 1937, had a grudge against Britain in general and the Royal Navy in particular. Shy and reserved behind a brusque exterior, he was known for improvising frequently and not acting on advice. In June 1939, he was made Amiral de la Flotte, a rank created especially for him, and given command of the entire French Navy, including direct control of all operations in all theatres. As he was answerable directly to the government, it made him independent of general political support and to a large extent free from political control.
The 6,000-ton French cruiser Emile Bertin, which was commissioned in 1935. Her main armament consisted of three triple 15-cm turrets and she was reasonably well equipped with A/A guns. (Author’s collection)
There is no doubt that Darlan and most of his senior officers believed the Marine Nationale could match even the combined German and Italian navies if put to the test, without the support of the Royal Navy. Hence, there was virtually no exchange of plans or points of view between the Admiralty and the French Naval Staff prior to the outbreak of war, largely due to common mistrust and an absence of mentors advocating the need for a common strategy. Joint Anglo-French naval staff conferences were held in London on 31 March, 27 April and 3 May 1939, but these had little influence on the practicalities in either navy. On 23 August, the French naval reservists were called, all leave cancelled and men ordered to report back to their ships immediately. Plans for liaison with the Royal Navy were activated and French naval officers were sent to Malta, Gibraltar, Plymouth and Dover while similar British contingents arrived in Bizerte, Toulon, Brest and Dunkirk, in addition to large naval missions in London and Paris, respectively. On the 25th, a common signal code, prepared in utmost secrecy, was activated. Still, the cooperation between the Marine Nationale and the Royal Navy would never prosper, and by the summer of 1940 Admiral Darlan’s inability to develop a proper cooperation with the British virtually sidelined the Marine Nationale.20
Starting to Rearm
In their annual review for 1933, the British Chiefs of Staff wrote: ‘Germany is not only starting to rearm, but she will continue this process until within a few years hence she will have to be reckoned as a formidable military power.’ The Baldwin cabinet responded by establishing a Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) under the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) to assess ways of meeting the worst defence deficiencies and re-establishing a military force adequate for the situation.21 Later, a new ministerial appointment for the coordination of defence was also made to focus the efforts inside the cabinet.22
The possibility of a three-sided conflict with Germany in Europe, Italy in the Mediterranean and Japan in the Far East emerged during the early 1930s, and the motivation of the Admiralty for the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 was the wish to keep German naval rearmament at a qualitative level where it could be matched by the existing Home Fleet. By allowing the Kriegsmarine to aim for a ‘balanced fleet’, the treaty meant that Germany would have to spread its resources and build many types of ships rather than focusing on those most dangerous for Britain.
The Royal Navy was not the service that was in the worst state, but the situation was sinister. Capital ships were largely obsolete and even if light cruisers, destroyers and submarines were relatively modern, their numbers were insufficient. In July 1934, the cabinet approved a modest five-year programme to try to mend some of the deficiencies of the naval forces. A prioritised modernisation of battleships and cruisers commenced, but the refits would take time and the ships undergoing the upgrading would be out of commission for years. It was February 1936 before political agreement for a factual expansion programme of the armed forces was reached and an accelerated warship-building programme initiated. From £53.5 million in 1933, the naval budget increased to £127.2 million in 1938. A significant part of this had to be used for upgrades and modernisations, though, and only a slow increase in building could be envisaged. As a stopgap measure, some of the older capital ships were taken to the yards for modernisation: Warspite, Renown and Malaya first. Armament, armour, fire-control systems and machinery were prioritised, together with A/A and torpedo protection. The ships were virtually rebuilt and the process took years. Still, they were back in commission before the war. Valiant and Queen Elizabeth were not, and further upgrades, including that of Hood, were cancelled. The County-class cruisers were also upgraded before the war with additional armour and A/A armament.
Unexpectedly, the lack of shipyards, skilled labour and a high-tech naval industry turned out to be a major challenge, creating a growing dependence on foreign deliveries. High-quality steel was in such short supply that some of the new cruisers and carriers had to use Czechoslovak armour. Likewise, Swedish Bofors and Swiss Oerlikon A/A guns had to be imported as such weapons could not be manufactured in Britain. Most serious was the fact that an inferior fire-control system for the A/A guns was chosen, largely due to incompetence and inability of British engineering firms to manufacture the precision instruments needed in the superior systems.
Nevertheless, construction of new ships commenced, and it was projected that at the end of 1940 the Royal Navy would have 15 capital ships, 8 carriers, 70 cruisers, some 145 destroyers and 55 submarines. As things turned out, however, the newbuilds would largely replace the losses inflicted by the war, rather than increase the fleet.23
During the late 1930s, discussions within the Royal Navy arose as to where the main wartime anchorage for the Home Fleet should be: Rosyth or Scapa Flow. Many preferred the former, not least due to its less remote location. Eventually, during mid-1938, a decision was made in favour of the Orkneys, and during the Czech crisis in September 1938 the Home Fleet was assembled at Scapa Flow for the first time since 1919. It became instantly obvious that the anchorage was inadequately equipped and protected, vulnerable to both submarine and aircraft attacks. Hence, Loch Ewe, Clyde and Rosyth had to be used as well until adequate defences had been installed at Scapa Flow. This would take time, though, due to lack of priority and funds, and actual improvements at Scapa Flow between the Munich summit and the outbreak of the war were limited.24
In April 1938 Admiral Roger Backhouse was appointed First Sea Lord, and Admiral Charles Forbes took his place as C-in-C of the Home Fleet. Forbes (aged fifty-eight) was an experienced sailor, both in the staff role and on the bridge, who strongly disliked publicity. His flag lieutenant from his later days in command, Godfrey Style, described him as ‘always calm, always the same, and always correctly dressed’.25 In another subordinate’s view, he had ‘a fine brain and a tremendously powerful character’.26
Backhouse died less than a year after becoming First Sea Lord, and his successor was Admiral Alfred Dudley Pound (aged sixty-two), recalled from his post as C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet in June 1939. Pound was a very experienced admiral indeed, but by many was considered ‘rugged and undistinguished, solidly middle-class . . . with a mind untroubled by large strategic visions’.27 Not always good at detailing tasks to subordinates – or if he did, at trusting their assessments – Pound was to carry a heavy burden through the first part of the war. His capacity for work endeared him to Churchill and, after a rather cold start, a very special relationship developed between the two men. They were truly different in character, temper and competence but with an aligned belief in the Royal Navy as the senior service. Between Forbes and Pound, though, an unconstructive personal relationship developed that was to affect the Home Fleet’s operations in the first period of the war. Unlike the War Office and the Air Ministry, the Admiralty was an operational centre, and information was often available to the First Sea Lord before it reached the commanding officers at sea. This gave him an opportunity to interfere, which Pound often could not resist, to Forbes’ intense dislike.28
The Naval Staff met daily to review
