consider reports and decide matters on which immediate action was necessary. In mid-1939, the deputy chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS) was Rear Admiral Tom Phillips. The Second Sea Lord, Admiral Charles Little, was responsible for all matters concerning personnel, while the Third Sea Lord or Controller, Rear Admiral Bruce Fraser, oversaw design and construction of warships, including machinery, weapons and equipment. Fourth Sea Lord Rear Admiral Geoffrey Arbuthnot dealt with the procurement and distribution of stores and supplies, including fuel, and Fifth Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Alexander Ramsay – replaced by Vice Admiral Guy Royle in November 1939 – was responsible for all aspects of naval aviation.29
Defence of the Fleet
During WWI, the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) developed from very small beginnings to a major service in its own right. Still, the navy to a large degree supported the establishment of an independent Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1918, accepting the argument that a single force would optimise aircraft and engine development and ensure effective operational control. An agreement was reached whereby the Royal Navy would operate the ships, while the RAF would provide the aircraft and the men to fly and service them, onboard or ashore. Maritime aviation was quickly sidelined within the RAF, however, creating a detrimental conflict between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry.
When Admiral Alfred Chatfield became First Sea Lord in 1933, he carried with him experience from the Mediterranean, where the carriers Glorious, Furious and Eagle had been part of his command. He lobbied extensively for an independent naval air force, arguing that such sophisticated services as operating and flying aircraft at sea needed dedicated involvement. Eventually, he was heard, and in 1937 the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) was moved from RAF to Admiralty control as a branch of the Royal Navy. Sulking, the RAF developed tactics to deal with the threat to seaborne trade at the source, bombing shipyards and naval bases, eliminating the need for a specialised anti-shipping strike force. Occasional bombing trials against maritime targets were considered satisfactory and only a limited number of reconnaissance and flying-boat squadrons were necessary for escort, anti-submarine patrols and reconnaissance. Long-distance navigation over the sea was brushed over, and few if any British aircrews had any training in this by September 1939.30
In spite of the addition of a Fifth Sea Lord as Chief of the Naval Air Services to the Board of the Admiralty, the FAA was in a rather sorry state as war approached. Experience in the tactical use of carrier-based aircraft was limited, both in the Royal Navy and in the FAA itself, all the more so as the approximately 200 carrier-aircraft were largely obsolete – Swordfish, Skua, Roc and Sea Gladiators.31 Budgetary reasons must take a fair share of the blame for this, but traditionalist British naval officers also held that aircraft would never be a danger to capital ships at sea and were unwilling to spend resources on their development.
Contrary to the tactics developed during the later Norwegian campaign, where carrier task forces operated without capital ships, in the mid-1930s the British carriers were seen as scouts for the fleet, with defence of its own ships and attacking those of the enemy as secondary tasks. The offensive role, using bombs and torpedoes, was not ignored, but it was felt that this should only be considered under favourable conditions and then mainly to slow down enemy ships so that they could be brought to action. This concept of carrier deployment would dominate British naval thinking between the wars, leading to the building of heavily armoured carriers that would take fewer aircraft and preventing a dynamic development of their strategic and tactical deployment. By 1939, the doctrine had been modified somewhat, but reconnaissance and shadowing were still considered the primary roles for the FAA.
A few years after WWI, three carriers remained in service with the Royal Navy: Furious, Argus and Vindictive, in addition to the seaplane carrier Pegasus. Of these, only Argus had a through deck. Vindictive was reconverted to a cruiser in 1923, while Furious was rebuilt and upgraded, emerging as a flush-decked fleet carrier with two hangars and lifts capable of operating up to sixty-one aircraft. Hermes, the first Royal Navy carrier built from scratch, was no more than 11,000 tons. She was intended as a scout assisting the fleet’s cruisers and carried only twenty-five aircraft. Eagle had twice the displacement but barely any more aircraft.32 Courageous and Glorious, originally completed as ‘large light cruisers’, had hull sizes and speeds rendering them suitable for adaptation to carriers, and conversion work was started in 1923. When completed in 1928 and 1930, respectively, they could operate some thirty-five aircraft each and were satisfactory stopgap vessels.33
When Ark Royal was completed in November 1938, several novel ideas were introduced, including arrester cables and compressed steam catapults, making limited deck space available for arming, fuelling and flight preparation.34 The keel length was limited to 670 feet by dry-dock capacity in Gibraltar and Malta, but the flight deck was extended to 800 feet, with a pronounced overhang over bow and stern. As the two hangar decks were within the hull, the flight deck rose to some 65 feet above the waterline, giving the Ark a characteristic towering profile, unlike any other ship at the time. To save weight, welding was used where possible, while armour plating was limited to the belt, engine rooms and magazines.35 For the same reason, the flight deck was not armoured, making the ship vulnerable to air attack, but increasing stability and operational endurance. Six boilers powered three turbines, one to each propeller, giving a maximum speed of over 31 knots – a necessity to operate safely and efficiently during flight operations without slowing down the fleet she was meant to accompany. A/A armament was limited, but the Ark was not meant to be alone. A screen of destroyers and cruisers would always be near, while she could concentrate on operating aircraft. That the companions had limited A/A capacity themselves was overlooked. With a theoretical capacity of seventy-two aircraft, Ark Royal rarely operated more than fifty aircraft in the beginning of the war, reflecting the lack of aircraft and pilots. Normally, during these times, two squadrons of Fairey Swordfish biplane reconnaissance torpedo bombers and two of Blackburn Skua dive-bombers were on board, the latter also taking on the interceptor and defensive fighter role.36
Top, aircraft carrier Furious. (Sellicks) Below, aircraft carrier Ark Royal. (Valentines)
In 1939, Ark Royal entered service alongside Hermes, Eagle, Courageous and Glorious, while Furious and Argus were used for training purposes. Furious was recalled to active service shortly after the outbreak of war, while Argus remained in a training role.37 Six new, fully armoured, 23,000-ton carriers of the Illustrious- and Implacable-classes had been laid down from 1937 but none of these would be operational until the end of 1940.
* * *
On 26 August 1939, Admiral Forbes took Nelson and the rest of the Home Fleet from Scapa Flow to patrol the Shetland–Bergen narrows. With four capital ships, one carrier, two cruisers and ten destroyers, it was but a fraction of the fleets Jellicoe and Beatty had commanded, but it would have to do. On 29 August, the order went out for a general mobilisation in Britain and at 16:38 the Admiralty issued a signal to all British Naval units to mobilise for ‘war with a European power’. Two days later, on the 31st, Admiral Forbes ordered his ships to: ‘complete fusing of all shells. Ship all warheads. Prepare for war.’38
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The Admiral’s Navy
IN ADDITION TO GERMANY
