to this, guerrilla warfare was the primary mission which received the bulk of support and funding. Now these units would be responsible for a broader, more balanced range of unconventional and special warfare operations. Prolonged political subversion and intelligence collection became the primary mission. In 1970, SOF personnel strength was estimated at 15,000. This figure dramatically increased to 41,000 by 1978 and to 80,000 by 1984.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, DPRK continued to conduct infiltration and special operations against the ROK. These missions did not have the same lethality that those in the 1960s had. KPA SOF utilized overland but preferred seaborne insertion methods such as using high-speed infiltration craft; however, all attempted to exfiltrate via land through the DMZ.
By the late 1970s, the term “special purpose forces” was coined to describe those KPA units that possessed ranger/commando- and special forces-type capabilities, as well as capabilities for unconventional warfare and special operations.
From 1970 to 1980, at least six infiltration teams were engaged and killed or destroyed. However, in 1974, Kim Il Sung still sent assassination teams to kill ROK President Park Chung Hee, all failing in their attempts (although they did kill Park’s wife).
In 1982-83, North Korea implemented a series of organizational changes which reorganized the intelligence and internal security services and separated MPAF from the State Administration Council and placed it under the CMC (which later evolved into the NDC). During this organization, programs to mechanize and modernize the KPA as well as cultivate the KPA’s special warfare assets, and the capabilities of the Reconnaissance Bureau and VIII Special Corps were developed and implemented.
In 1984-85, the KPAF acquired 87 Hughes MD500 Defender helicopters which were repainted with ROKAF paint schemes. Thus reconfigured, these helicopters would prove significantly useful in any operations against the ROK.
In the 1980s, the KPA began to improve and increase its airborne and seaborne lift capabilities. In 1987, KPA amphibious warfare (which included new amphibious doctrine and industrial production) began constructing high-speed air-cushion landing craft (speeds up to 52 knots and carrying 40-50 troops) which significantly improved the KPA’s amphibious assault capability, especially into the ROK rear areas which have large mud flats.
During the early 1990s, the VIII Special Corps was renamed the Light Infantry Training and Guidance Bureau. The special purpose forces continued to expand during this period from 85,000 troops organized into 22 brigades in 1990 to approximately 100,000 troops organized into 25 brigades in 1996.
Foreign Military Assistance Using SOF Assets. From 1969-89, the DPRK expanded its foreign military assistance to a number of developing countries and to its support for terrorist and revolutionary groups. Personnel from the VIII Special Corps and Reconnaissance Bureau provided the majority of the advisors sent overseas on military assistance missions and would serve as instructors and trainers to terrorist and revolutionary groups both overseas and within the DPRK. As late as 1995, the DPRK invited members of the terrorist organization Abu Nidal to North Korea and continued to support rebel groups in the Philippines.
Beginning in 1990, several organizational changes occurred within the DPRK that enhanced Kim Jong Il’s control over the KPA and affected both the VIII Special Corps and the intelligence services. The first was the establishment of the NDC and the transferring of MPAF to the NDC. On December 24, 1991, Kim Jong Il was appointed supreme commander of the KPA, and 1 year later, he was appointed chairman of the NDC. Because of Kim Jong Il’s moves, the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 had minimal observable effect on the special forces or even the KPA in general.
SOF Missions. Today, KPA Special Purpose Forces have evolved the following missions:
Seizure or destruction of (enemy) strategic/ theater and global command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), missile, radar, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare assets.
Interdiction, seizure, or control of strategic targets (air bases, naval bases, port facilities, POL facilities, lines of communications, and nuclear power plants within [ROK] rear areas).
Raids against U.S. Air Force and Navy bases in Japan and Okinawa and conceivably against military installations in Guam, Hawaii and the continental United States.
Seizure of critically important topographic features (mountain passes, tunnels, bridges, etc.) and civilian facilities (railroads, highways, airports, power plants, etc.).
Interdiction, seizure, and control of ROK/U.S. lines of communications, for the interdiction of reinforcements and supplies for forces deployed along the DMZ, and in advance of, or in support of, regular ground force operations.
Targeting for long-range artillery.
Establishing intelligence networks in the ROK.
Creating insurgency in the ROK, recruiting and controlling insurgent forces (a Primary Second Front Mission).
Targeting reconnaissance for DPRK WMD (e.g., ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, and possibly nuclear devices).
Covert delivery of biological weapons.
Assassination or abduction of ROK political leaders and senior ROK/U.S. military commanders.
Strategic reconnaissance and the provision of timely and accurate intelligence to the General Staff Department and corps commanders.
Kidnapping and diversionary operations.
Establishing military and political intelligence nets within the ROK and fostering the growth of guerrilla forces.
Military training to foreign revolutionary organizations, organizations.
Military assistance, training, and internal security for Kim’s inner circle (to include body guards and palace guards),
Assisting friendly governments and organizations (e.g., Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, PLO, and Burundi).
SOF forces can conduct operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. During offensive operations, SOF reconnaissance units would conduct penetration (into enemy territory) missions to collect military intelligence and launch raids on military and civilian targets. Prior to the main attack, some units would infiltrate behind enemy lines by air and sea, while others would cross into the ROK through tunnels under the DMZ or along the mountain ridges.
The Special Purpose Forces Command is organized into eight sniper brigades, with two amphibious brigades and two airborne brigades; and 12 light infantry brigades, with three airborne brigades, 17 reconnaissance battalions, one airborne battalion, and eight Bureau of Reconnaissance SOF battalions. The only organization controlling SOF units is the Reconnaissance Bureau and the Light Infantry Training and Guidance Bureau (formerly the VIII Special Purpose Corps). The Reconnaissance Bureau is composed of five departments, a number of operational units and reconnaissance brigades, and shares some of the responsibility for training and dispatching espionage and subversive agents to the south, with the Liaison and Operations Departments. It maintains a training center, the 907th Army Unit, to train South Korean Army personnel who have been abducted, or have defected to North Korea.
The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is the primary organization within the KPA tasked with the training and conducting of unconventional (asymmetric) and special warfare operations. During peacetime, it is believed to exercise administrative control over all special operations units, including those of the North Korean Air Force and Navy (the Air Force and
