in which there are three types of amphibious operations: (1) strategic — a multi-battalion operation; (2) operational — at battalion, company, or platoon strength; and (3) tactical (Sniper/ Special Operations) — from company down to squad or team. The KPN has a variety of amphibious lift craft to include approximately 135 Kong Bang (literally meaning “air bag”) class hovercrafts which can carry approximately 40 troops (no vehicles) and travel at speeds of 40 knots, as well as over 100 other types of amphibious ships. The KPA has the capability to transport approximately 15,000 troops by sea at one time, but doctrinally probably would use a handful of hovercrafts for small unit amphibious raids.
The KPN has a credible mine warfare capability which was first developed in the Korean War. Numerous surface ships and submarines are capable of delivering mines within both the navy and civilian sectors (merchant ships, fishing boats). Mines will be used to defend against amphibious assaults, defend strategic ports, and provide seaward flank protection for land forces. The KPN has a large inventory of outdated technological mines; although the total number of mines is unknown, it is assessed that North Korea has enough to satisfy their military objectives. Despite economic crises engulfing the country, limited access to modern technical equipment from abroad and fuel shortages which have restricted training and operations, the KPN still maintains the capability to conduct limited offensive and defensive wartime operations.
The KPN’s experiences with operating an inventory of both midget and coastal submarines and amphibious hovercraft provide it with the wartime ability to interdict commercial shipping to and from the ROK, particularly in the East Sea (Sea of Japan), and to conduct sub- stantial amphibious lift and limited mine laying operations. The KPN’s limited abilities to operate at night and in bad weather, as well as technical weaknesses in EW, SIGINT, ASW, and shipborne air defense capabilities, portend that the advanced weaponry and combined operations capabilities of the USN and ROKN, together with coalition air supremacy, would render the vast majority of the KPN’s surface combatants ineffective. However, the total numbers of KPN craft probably would create an allied logistic ordnance nightmare in providing the munitions needed to engage all of these ships.
KPN midget and coastal submarine operations undoubtedly would prove more problematic for the USN and ROKN and would likely survive for a considerable time. The KPN is primarily a capable coastal defense force when coupled with land-based coastal defense assets (artillery, surface-to-surface coastal cruise missiles, defensive mining).
The KPA, to include KPN forces, has taken on the U.S. Navy successfully with the capture of the USS Pueblo and the tragic shoot down of a USN EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft, with no measured U.S. military reaction against the KPN forces. Undoubtedly, the KPN uses this as a morale booster.
Air Force. The missions of the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) include:
Air and air defense of the homeland,
Tactical air support to the army and the navy,
Transportation and logistical support, and
Airborne insertion of special operations forces.
The KPAF has been reported to have over 100,000 personnel and an inventory of as many as 1-200-1,700 aircraft, and it controls and operates all aircraft (including the national airline — Air Koryo; there are no NK civilian aircraft), airfields, and airports within the DPRK. The KPAF retains a numerically significant inventory of Soviet and Chinese designed aircraft that date back to the 1950s and 1960s. However, in the late 1980s, Russia supplied a limited number of modern allweather air defense and ground-attack aircraft (MiG29’s).
Interceptor aircraft are an integral part of the DPRK’s air-defense network. Interceptors routinely fly combat air patrol missions to protect DPRK coastlines, military installations, and key urban areas. Although the KPAF employs dated Soviet and Chinese ground attack aircraft such as the IL-28/Beagle, Su-7/Fitter and MiG-19/Farmer, these aircraft can only operate in daylight and good weather. They only carry small bomb loads for relatively short distances, except for the IL-28 which can carry an air-launched version of the Styx anti-ship cruise missile. As previously discussed, the KPA appears to have replaced the longrange strike capability of its air force with long-range artillery and surface-to-surface missiles.
The KPAF has been successful in intercepting nonNorth Korean aircraft operating near its coastlines. In 1965, two North Korean MiG jet fighters “attacked and damaged” a U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance plane over the East Sea, about 50 miles east of the nearest North Korean coast. In 1969, KPAF North Korean MiG jet fighters shot down an unarmed U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane over the East Sea, about 90 miles off the North Korean coast, resulting in the loss of 31 lives.
On March 2, 2003, four KPAF aircraft — two MiG23MLs and two MiG-29As — intercepted a U.S. Air Force RC-135S COBRA BALL reconnaissance aircraft conducting a routine intelligence mission over the East Sea — approximately 130 NM from the DPRK coast. The four aircraft shadowed the RC-135s for approximately 20 minutes, during which they signaled for the aircraft to follow them and land in the DPRK, frequently maneuvering within 20 meters of its wings. The RC135S aborted its mission and returned to its base at Kadena Air Base, Japan.
While politically motivated, the interception of the RC-135S is noteworthy in that the mission showed a considerable degree of pre-mission intelligence collection and planning on the part of the KPAF, as the aircraft were staged from their west coast bases through air bases on the east coast. The MiG-29As came from the 55th Air Regiment based at Sunchon, while the MiG-23s came from the 60th Air Regiment based at Pukchang. It appears that the pilots chosen to perform this mission were among the best available to the KPAF, and it also is likely that, given the potential fallout of the mission, it was expressly approved by Kim Jong Il.
One of the KPAF SOF insertion aircraft reflects the KPA’s use of unsophisticated and dated design features to accommodate limitations in their technology. The AN-2/COLTis a slow-flying biplane that serves well in the role of insertion and extraction of special operations forces. It is rugged and easy to maintain, and can operate within all ranges of Korean climate. It has a cruising speed of 120 knots, but can fly as slow as 35 knots in some cases and is well-suited to flying low, using valleys to hide from radar. Its large wing area and engine allows it to take off from dirt strips in 2,130 feet or from paved surfaces (such as roads or airfields) in just over 1,300 feet. Maximum range for a stock AN2 with a full load is 186 miles, and they normally carry 10 soldiers. Reportedly, KPAF has over 300 AN-2’s and over 300 helicopters in its inventory.
The DPRK’s air defense network is arguably one of the densest in the world today, relying on surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs) systems and massive numbers of mobile and fixed anti-aircraft artillery weapons. The KPAF is responsible for ground air defense of the nation and the ground forces (however, the KPA ground forces maintain tactical air defense weapons to include man portable air defense missiles [MANPADs]. The DPRK’s air defense network is based on obsolete weapons, missiles, and radars; and is most effective at lower altitudes where masses of AAA fire can be brought to bear on an intruder. Medium and high altitude SA-2/3/5 surface-to-air missiles are ineffective in a modern EW environment.
The KPAF is assessed to possess only limited offensive and defensive wartime capabilities. This is based upon the KPAF’s inflexible and unsophisticated command and control system, large numbers of obsolete aircraft, low flight hours, limited access to spare parts for its few modern aircraft, and fuel shortages.
The KPAF is judged to be capable of conducting a surge of offensive operations only during the initial phase of any new war on the Korean Peninsula. It is judged to have only a limited capability of guarding DPRK airspace during peacetime. While the KPAF is numerically superior to the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) and U.S. air components deployed within the Republic of Korea (ROK), it is qualitatively inferior in all aspects.
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