capability on paper than it does in practice. It has not fought in any kind of meaningful air action since the Korean War. North Korean efforts to transfer technology, organization, and training methods from other nations on a patchwork basis often leaves critical gaps in national capability, even where other capabilities are effective.
It is unknown why North Korea has not modernized its air forces. Whether a lack of hard currency (no country will tender credit to North Korea to buy military hardware) or lack of doctrinal emphasis, the KPAF remains a low-tier priority. North Korea probably will rely on the successful operations of its SOF to destroy ROK and U.S. aircraft on the ground. The KPN and SOF will attempt to delay coalition resupply and reinforcement until such time that North Korea has gained its military objectives.
One last reason for the KPAF atrophy may be the reliance on North Korea’s new missiles and WMD capabilities. The KPA may have determined that their growing surface-to-surface missile inventory (800+), as well as their chemical and nuclear capabilities, would be sufficient to counter any enemy air threat.
Paramilitary and Reserve Forces. The establishment of paramilitary and reserve type units within the DPRK dates to the 1950s, although it was not until the early 1960s and the formulation of the Four Military Lines that the DPRK undertook concerted efforts to increase the size, number, and capabilities of such units. The DPRK’s paramilitary reserve forces total almost 7 1/2 million personnel, with approximately 30 percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 60. This sizable force is organized into four primary components: Workers’-Peasants’ Red Guard (WPRG) (more than 4 million personnel); Red Youth Guard (RYG) (more than 1 million high school and college male and female students); Paramilitary Training Unit (PTU) (almost 2 million personnel); and the People’s Guard troops (approximately 400,000 personnel). These reserve forces are estimated to be organized into 40 infantry divisions and 18 infantry brigades.
The PTUs (a.k.a., Reserve Military Training Units, Pacification Units, Guidance Units, Instructional Units, Instruction Guidance Units, or Reserve Units) are the primary ready reserve force of the MPAF and are capable of being immediately mobilized and incorporated into the KPA in times of war or national emergency. The PTUs have the capability, training, and equipment to execute the following peacetime missions: (1) maintain a trained military force of KPA veterans who can be immediately mobilized and incorporated into the KPA, and (2) provision the security force for large government buildings, facilities, and property.
The WPRG, People’s Guard, and the RYG would take longer to achieve combat readiness and probably would be employed as rear area security units or as reinforcements or replacements for regular KPA units rather then as new combat units.
Beginning during the 1980s, the KPA initiated a series of force improvements to reorganize and revitalize its paramilitary and reserve forces in line with newly developing concepts of wartime operations. These improvements included PTUs acquiring additional artillery. They also were restructured and exercised to facilitate out-of-area operations in support of regular KPA ground forces. Finally, at the MPAF-level (probably now at the NDC-level), a new command structure was created for the wartime mission of rear area defense.
The entire lifecycle of the average North Korean citizen is centered on some sort of military service that begins as a young adult (15 to 17) where they usually serve in the RYG and finish in the WPRG at the age of 60. The net result of this lifelong process is that North Korea is one of the most militarized nations in the world and is a country possessing a trained reserve manpower pool that allows it to expand the size of its active armed forces rapidly in times of national emergency or war.
A secondary effect of this lifelong military service is that it provides an indoctrination that would improve a North Korean insurgency effort significantly, if required. Additionally, the North Korean people may not be as receptive to an “invading” force whose intent is to liberate them from tyranny.
Combat Readiness. Before examining North Korea’s military readiness and capabilities, the definitions of the terms should be clarified. A common analytical mistake occurs when the same metrics used to review U.S. military readiness and capabilities are applied to an adversary.
The objective of the U.S. Army’s readiness reporting system is to measure an organization’s readiness to accomplish its assigned mission — in other words, to measure how ready it is to go to war today, and how effectively it could prosecute the war. These metrics are used to satisfy the U.S. Army’s objectives as they relate to U.S. National Military Strategy and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review — usually dealing with issues of a global nature. North Korea’s strategic objectives are regional and do not require the same scope of readiness that the U.S. military requires. At one point, the Pentagon considered readiness as only one of four elements or pillars on which military capability rests:
Force Structure: The number, size, and composition of military units;
Modernization: The technical sophistication of the forces, weapon systems, and equipment;
Sustainability: The “staying power” of the forces measured in days; and,
Readiness: The immediate ability to execute a designated combat mission.
Readiness has been defined in many ways. Some definitions, as Richard Betts pointed out in his book, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, are fairly broad and synonymous with overall military capabilities — for example, the “balancing of manpower, investment, and operations and maintenance expenditures that produce the force structure capability of rapid, sustained, and ultimate full response.” However, most definitions are narrower, focusing on the ability to respond quickly. For this monograph, the following will be used:
The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they are designed and to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays.
The capacity to perform missions when directed to do so.
A force’s ability to fight with little or no warning.
The fraction of a force committed to a fight without unacceptable delays and that acquits itself well.
The ability of the currently configured force structure to perform its assigned missions promptly.
Deliver and Deploy Without Unacceptable Delays. During the Korean War, lack of adequate logistics hampered North Korea’s military forces and kept North Korea from completely controlling the peninsula. Thus, sustainability of the North Korean military forces became a primary requirement, and the country continues to maintain war reserves for all classes of supply for 6 months of sustainability for regular forces and 3 months for reserve units and paramilitary forces. A major increase in the number of active forces and the deployment of many new types of weapons systems in the past 20 years complicate this doctrine; however, North Korea’s massive war reserve stockpiles continue to expand despite the tremendous cost to its economic structure and hardship to its people.
On the negative side of the military-first rule, due to the over-expansion of military roles, the overpoliticization of the KPA, and the “military sprawl” in the North Korean society, the KPA’s primary role, i.e., the military defense of North Korea, probably would be downgraded and downplayed. Despite the KPA’s continuous claim on almost half of the DPRK’s government budget, its resources are still limited and unduly stretched out. As a result, the KPA’s military readiness suffers, and actual military capabilities continue to deteriorate despite the military-first policy.
North Korea expanded its ammunition and equipment storage capacities by building hardened and underground facilities and enlarging existing facilities as well as major national-level
