hypothesis predicts that if you feel empathic concern for another member of the group, you will be altruistically motivated to benefit that person. So, if you can allocate resources to them, then rather than the two motives traditionally assumed to conflict in a social dilemma – self‐interest and the common good – three motives are in play. And if, along with egoism (self‐interest), the altruistic motive is stronger than the desire to promote the common good, the latter will suffer.
How often does empathy‐induced altruistic motivation arise in real‐world social dilemmas? It’s hard to think of a case where it doesn’t. It arises every time we try to decide whether to spend our time or money to benefit ourselves, the community, or another individual about whom we especially care. I may decline to participate in a neighborhood clean‐up project on Saturday not because I want to play golf but because my son wants me to take him to a movie. Whalers may kill to extinction – and loggers clear‐cut – not out of personal greed but to provide for their families.
Consistent with this empathy‐altruism prediction, Batson, Batson, et al. (1995) found that research participants placed in a social dilemma allocated some of their resources to a person for whom they felt empathy, reducing the overall collective good. And Oceja et al. (2014) found that if there is reason to believe that one or more other individuals in the group have needs similar to the need that induced empathy, resources may be preferentially allocated to them as well.
Highlighting a situation in which empathy‐induced altruism poses an even greater threat to the common good than does self‐interested egoism, Batson et al. (1999) found that when allocation decisions were to be made public, empathy‐induced altruism reduced the common good whereas self‐interest did not. Why would this be? There are clear social norms and sanctions against pursuit of self‐interest at the expense of what’s best for all: “Selfish” and “greedy” are stinging epithets (Kerr, 1995). Norms and sanctions against showing concern for another person’s interests – even if doing so diminishes the common good – are far less clear. How do whalers and loggers stand up to the public outcry about over‐depletion of natural resources? It’s easy. They aren’t using these resources for themselves but to care for their families.
If altruism poses such a threat to the common good, why don’t we have societal sanctions against altruism like those against egoism? Perhaps it’s because society makes one or both of two assumptions: (a) altruism is always good and (b) altruism is weak (if it exists at all). We now have good reason to think that each of these assumptions is wrong.
Conclusion
Research over the past four decades designed to test the empathy‐altruism hypothesis and its implications suggests not only that this hypothesis is true but also that empathy‐induced altruism can be a powerful positive force in human affairs. It offers benefits in the form of more and more sensitive help for those in need, less aggression, increased cooperation in competitive situations, reduction of intergroup conflict, and improved attitudes toward and action on behalf of stigmatized groups. It may also provide health benefits to the altruistic helper.
Yet empathy‐induced altruism is not always a force for good. To use its power wisely, we need to be aware not only of its potential benefits but also its liabilities. It can, at times, bring harm to the altruistically motivated individual and to those in need. It can produce paternalism. It is more suited to addressing personal than global needs. It can arouse motivation to avoid feeling empathic concern when people know that to act on the resulting altruistic motivation will be either costly or ineffective. It can produce immoral action by leading us to show partiality toward those for whom we care, despite our moral standards dictating impartiality. And it can lead us to act against the common good in social dilemmas. Indeed, when our action is public, empathy‐induced altruism can pose a more serious threat to the common good than does self‐interested egoism.
These liabilities need to be taken into account in any attempt to promote human welfare by building on the empathy‐altruism research. Although we now have clear evidence that empathy‐induced altruistic motivation exists and can be pervasive and powerful, we also have clear evidence that unless handled with sensitivity to its limitations as well as its promise, it can harm not help.
If this conclusion is correct, how does the research on empathy‐induced altruism relate to positive psychology? Abraham Maslow, who is credited with first advocating positive psychology (in his Motivation and Personality, 1954), felt the discipline of psychology had made far more progress understanding our human shortcomings – our pathologies and weaknesses – than our strengths and potentialities. Without denying the importance of understanding and addressing pathology and weakness, Maslow sought to expand the scope of psychological theory and research to include the positive aspects of our nature. The empathy‐altruism hypothesis and related research also calls for an expansion of psychology. It calls for expansion of our understanding of human motivation to include more than self‐interested egoism. So, the empathy‐altruism research may seem a paradigm example of positive psychology – especially given that many people consider altruism a quintessentially positive attribute.
Personally, I think the relationship of empathy‐induced altruism to positive psychology is not as an exemplar but as a challenge: The empathy‐altruism research poses two questions for positive psychology. First, despite extending our view of human nature beyond deficiencies, has positive psychology extended it far enough? Not only for Maslow but also for the field of positive psychology when established 40 years later in the 1990s by Martin Seligman and others, the positives at issue are almost always positives for the individual – the individual’s happiness, creativity, subjective well‐being, social skills, self‐efficacy, flourishing, and so on. But if I actively seek one or more of these positives as an ultimate goal, my motivation is directed toward self‐benefit. And no matter how noble the sought self‐benefit, my motivation is egoistic. Even if, for example, I dedicate my life to caring for others as the way to live a full, meaningful life, this is still a form of egoism because my care for others is an instrumental goal on the way to the ultimate goal of living a full, meaningful life.
In contrast, the ultimate goal of empathy‐induced altruistic motivation isn’t self‐benefit, not even the noble self‐benefits extolled by positive psychology. Its ultimate goal is to benefit the person for whom empathy is felt. Thus, to find that the empathy‐altruism hypothesis is true extends our view of human nature beyond self‐interest – even in its most positive forms. If we can care for others for their sakes, our potential exceeds what positive psychology has envisioned.
Second, should not the “positive” and the “psychology” in positive psychology be kept distinct? Positive psychology focuses on what’s good about people. In contrast, the research reported in this chapter suggests that empathy‐induced altruistic motivation isn’t inherently good. Sometimes it leads us to act in ways that we or others judge good, and sometimes, in ways judged bad. Like any other natural phenomenon, empathy‐induced altruism isn’t inherently positive or negative; it just is. What we do with it is what is positive or negative.
Science, including psychology, can help us understand what is, but to decide whether and when some personal attribute is positive, negative, and neutral is a value judgment that takes us beyond science, including psychology. Should not the distinction between what is and whether and when what is good be applied not only to empathy‐induced altruism but also to the personal attributes that are the focus of positive psychology? Doing so would encourage exploration of possible negatives associated with these attributes, not only positives.
References
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2 Balzac, H. de. (1962). Père Goriot ( H. Reed, Trans.). New York,
