Part of Lacan’s explicit purpose was to return to Freud himself, stripped of some of the intervening years of interpretation and adaptation. As he comments: ‘The meaning [sens] of a return to Freud is a return to Freud’s meaning [sens].’126 A crucial text was the 1953 Rome lecture ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’, which has been described as ‘for all practical purposes the manifesto of the structuralist reinterpretation of Freud’.127
Miller notes that instead of a recording being made, or Lacan’s notes being available for editing, the seminar sessions were recorded in shorthand by a stenographer and then typed up. Copies were made of this typescript, which circulated for several years before Miller began the process of editing the seminars for publication.128 But the stenographer only began work when the seminar moved to Sainte-Anne. As a consequence, there are few traces of the first two years’ sessions, looking at Freud’s most famous case studies. In 1953 Lacan indicates that the ‘Wolf Man’ was the focus in the first year (1951–2); the ‘Rat Man’ in the second (1952–3).129 In the first year he also discussed the Dora case, but no notes survive.130 Miller suggests that ‘Intervention on Transference’ in Écrits contains echoes of this year’s discussion.131 In the second year Lacan discussed the ‘Wolf Man’ case again, of which some notes are available.132 The opening lines of the first session refer back to the Dora case. Unfortunately, no notes on the ‘Rat Man’ discussion have been preserved. However, Lacan’s Paris lecture ‘The Neurotic’s Individual Myth’, which was circulated in unauthorized form from 1953, and finally published in 1978, may draw on material first delivered in this seminar.133 Miller also suggests that the Rome lecture reflects this work.134
For his 1953–4 seminar, Lacan discussed ‘Freud’s papers on technique’, and a partial transcript forms the first volume of the published seminars.135 Unfortunately almost all of the 1953 material is lost, with the published version really beginning with the 13 January 1954 session. Lacan utilized material from the seminar in some of his other lectures and writings. ‘Variations on the Standard Treatment’ and ‘Introduction and Reply to Hyppolite’ stem directly from this seminar, and were published in 1955 and 1956 but, as Miller has noted, texts from several years later pick up and elaborate on themes discussed in this class. He mentions two: ‘Remarks on Daniel Lagache’ in 1960, and ‘The Mistaking of the Subject Supposed to Know’ from 1968.136 In 1954–5 the seminar topic was ‘The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis’.137 The two key texts read were Freud’s ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ and ‘The Ego and the Id’.138 In these early years Lacan was therefore working through Freud’s texts systematically – beginning with the case studies, moving to the papers on technique, and then material on metapsychology. In 1955–6 he turned to the psychoses, mainly through a reading of the case of Judge Schreber.139
Maurice Pinguet notes that Foucault went every week to hear Lacan, and a diary entry suggests this began in 1951.140 Pinguet was a friend of Foucault from their days at the ENS, who moved to Japan in the 1950s (C 17/17; 22/24).141 He adds that Foucault also attended the seminars when they moved to Sainte-Anne, and explicitly mentions the theme of the papers on technique.142 While Lacan’s seminar continued, with some disruptions, and several changes of venue, until shortly before his death, Foucault stopped attending when he went to Uppsala in 1955 (DE#281 IV, 58; EW III, 258). The first two published seminars, and the traces of the two previous years, are therefore the most relevant for looking at the exposure Foucault had to his ideas. It is notable that while Lacan regularly asks attendees to comment or contribute to the seminar, Foucault is not called upon in extant materials. Of course, at the time Foucault was only in his mid to late twenties and hardly well known.
Foucault’s attendance from the beginning means that, in Macey’s words, that he was ‘one of the first to bring to the rue d’Ulm news of the ‘return to Freud’, or in other words of Lacan’s reformulation of psychoanalytic principles in the light of modern linguistics, anthropology and philosophy and of his dismissal of the ‘ego-psychology’ which, he claimed was reducing psychoanalysis to a ‘banal psycho-social engineering’.143 In particular, while his own work was informed by Heidegger, Lacan took a clear distance from the existential psychotherapy movement. This was not always the case. In 1932, not long after completing his doctoral dissertation, Lacan sent an article to Binswanger dedicated to him.144
While Foucault attended at least some sessions, and clearly read some of Lacan’s work from quite early on, his attitude seems ambivalent.145 Pinguet says that Foucault admired Lacan enormously, and recalls a conversation around 1953 in which Foucault told him that ‘in psychoanalysis today it is only Lacan who is of importance!’146 Yet Macey interviewed Jacqueline Verdeaux for his biography, and reports her view that Foucault ‘had little sympathy for Lacan’s overall project and poured scorn on his philosophical pretensions. The psychoanalyst’s pilgrimage to see Heidegger in Freiburg in 1950 provoked great mirth on Foucault’s part, as well as some very disparaging comments on Lacan’s philosophical competence in unpublished letters to Verdeaux.’147 Her husband Georges Verdeaux had produced a thesis under Lacan’s supervision in 1944.148 Nonetheless, Foucault could be more positive, such as in the Binswanger introduction (DE#1 I, 73; DIE 37–8). In 1961, he said that while French psychoanalysis had initially been ‘strictly orthodox’, more recently it had ‘taken on a second and more prestigious life, due as you know, to Lacan’ (DE#5 I, 168; FL 8).
Foucault’s early publications have only limited relation to what he heard in these seminars. Maladie mentale et personnalité was completed in late 1953, and the Binswanger introduction over Easter 1954. As Chapter 4 will note, there is one indication in the introduction of something he probably heard in a seminar; and Chapter 3 notes how Lacan may have influenced the reading of Freud in Maladie mentale et personnalité. Foucault’s relation to Lacan will be discussed further in The Archaeology of Foucault.
Yet perhaps the most significant early influence in psychology comes from a figure who might be thought to play a more important role in Foucault’s understanding of philosophy, Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty had made his reputation with The Phenomenology of Perception, his 1945 primary thesis.149 But Merleau-Ponty’s secondary thesis, The Structure of Behaviour [comportement] was actually published first, in 1942, and was perhaps more significant for Foucault.150 As the book begins, Merleau-Ponty states that his ‘goal is to understand the relations between consciousness and nature: organic, psychological or even social. By nature we understand here a multiplicity of events external to each other and bound together by relations of causality.’151 Yet Merleau-Ponty does not structure his enquiry on the basis of a subject who perceives, but grounds it on the basis of the psychological and biological research of the time. However, his argument is that the Gestalt theorists did not fully appreciate the consequences of their research. In demonstrating that even the simplest experience was structured by an underlying form, rather than learned, their work fundamentally challenged knowledge and being. What is clear from both these early works is that scientific research provides a rich resource for his enquiries. Biology and psychology, especially, can be used to resource his philosophical enquiry. While he does not use them as a foundational basis, nor does he share Heidegger’s critical position that ‘no result of any science can ever be applied immediately to philosophy’.152 In the Preface to the second edition Alphonse de Waelhens explains Merleau-Ponty’s distance from Heidegger: ‘But in Being and Time one does not find thirty lines concerning the problem of perception; one does not find ten concerning that of the body.’153 For Foucault, studying both psychology and philosophy, the rich interrelation of these themes in Merleau-Ponty’s work was clearly appealing.
In a wide-ranging 1978 interview with the Italian Marxist Duccio Trombadori Foucault notes the Hegelian influence of
