specifically, she points out that the work includes theories - such as: the definition of space and time as formal principles, the distinctions between empirical and pure intuitions, between receptivity and spontaneity as well as between form and content - that will be reechoed in the Critique (Jiménez Rodríguez 2016, p. 431).
In the following sections, I shall stress that after the Dilucidatio of 1755 ‘schema’ is taken up again only fifteen years later, namely in the dissertation De mundi intelligibilis atque sensibilis forma et principiis from 1770. As the term, here, refers to the notions of the forms of the worlds I will give a short overview of this topic.
2.2.1 Schema and the forms of the worlds
Thanks to his Dissertation Kant obtained the position of Professor of Logics and Metaphysics at Königsberg. One of the main themes of the De mundi intelligibilis atque sensibilis forma et principiis lies in the antinomical (Hinske 1980) contrast between the laws of the understanding and of the pure reason and those of the intuitive faculty, which implies a distinction between two kinds of knowledge (intellectual and empirical) and two kinds of entities: phenomena, objects “as they appear” in sensibility and things in themselves.
With this sharp distinction between intelligible and sensible levels, Kant situates himself in accordance with traditional views such as those of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and Christian Wolff, while through his reference to the notion of form he distances himself from them, introducing a novelty regarding the theory of sensibility. According to Kant, the unity and organisation of empirical elements is provided not by the matter itself, but by formal principles, which, although not sensible, are implied in the constitution of the objects of experience. Although defined as forms, these principles are not conceived as the ancient ousia, as a static and immutable essence of a thing, rather they are dynamic relations, coordinative functions:
“Form, which consists in the co-ordination, not in the subordination, of substances. For co-ordinates are related to one another as complements to a whole, while subordinates are related to one another as caused and cause, or, generally, as principle and that which is governed by principle.’ The former relationship is reciprocal and homonymous, so that any correlate is related to the other as both determining it and being determined by it.” (AA II, p. 390)54←47 | 48→
It is precisely in reference to the explanation of the constitution of sensible objects, i.e. representations, that the first use of the term ‘schema’ in the work is found. As the author states, each sensible representation is given both by matter, which reveals the presence of something sensible, although it depends in its quality also on the nature of the subject, and by form:
“Moreover, just as the sensation which constitutes the matter of a sensible representation is, indeed, evidence for the presence of something sensible, though in respect of its quality is dependent upon the nature of the subject insofar as the latter is capable of modification by the object in question, so also the form of the same representation is undoubtedly evidence of a certain reference in what is sensed, though properly speaking it is not an outline or any kind of schema of the object, but only a certain law, which is inherent in the mind and by means of which it co-ordinates for itself that which is sensed from the presence of the object.” (AA II. p. 393)55
Here “schema” or “the outline” refers no longer to the divine understanding as it did in the Dilucidatio, but to an unclear image, a “shadow” (adumbratio in the Latin text), which is opposed to form, because the form is defined as an internal law of the mind, according to which the objects of experience can be structured and organised. But what is meant precisely by formal principles? What are their features? According to Kant, a principle is that which contains the reason of a relation. While the principle of the form of the intelligible world is an objective cause, the world of phenomena, i.e. of our experience, has a subjective principle only. The latter is regarded as a law of the mind (animo), according to which things appear as if they belong necessarily to a whole. This principle has no validity for objects that cannot be objects of our possible experience. More specifically, Kant states that there are two formal principles of the sensible world: space and time.←48 | 49→
“These formal principles of the phenomenal universe are absolutely primary and universal; they are, so to speak, the schemata and conditions of everything sensitive in human cognition. I shall now show that there are two such principles, namely, space and time.” (AA II, p. 398)56
In the above-mentioned passage, ‘schema’ assumes a new significance: it does not refer to something unclear, nor does it mention the divine understanding of the Dilucidatio. Instead, it refers to the conditions of sensibility and human knowledge, namely the formal principles of space and time, which are provided with characteristics, which will be reechoed in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Since the last occurrence of the term ‘schema’ is found in reference to the elucidation of the forms of space and time, I will briefly introduce the characteristics of these forms. Kant first clarifies the notion of time, because it is more general than space: each experience, is at least temporal (“internal” such as emotions), while some are also spatial (“external” for instance: representations of objects and events). Because time is the most general condition of experience, it does not derive from the senses, but it is a presupposition of them and for this reason it is non-discursive, in opposition to thoughts, which are abstract and derivative.
Moreover, time must be one, singular, identical, and homogeneous (quantum continuum) in order to explain the experiences of succession and simultaneity of the material elements that are related. Time is the possibility of this relation in itself and for this reason, time cannot be regarded as belonging to the same level of sensible features. In conclusion, time is defined as a pure subjective intuition (and not a discursive concept), which does not belong to nor derives from matter. The reference to time as “subjective” might be misleading: it seems, that time identifies a sort of natural human capacity as if Kant is providing a naturalistic or anthropological explanation of the process of experience. However, the allusion to time as a pure intuition suggests that such an interpretation has to be put aside. Time, then, is the condition of all sensible experience, or the universal form of all phenomena, through which they are perceived as existent and can be coordinated. It is this feature, which clearly and deeply differentiates Kant’s approach from, say, the empirical explanation of the process of knowledge by Johann Christian Lossius. In his Physischen Ursachen des Wahren of 1775 Lossius states that the principles of logic can be understood only through the reference to the organs that are implied in the production of ideas. This point of view is similar to that of Tetens, from which Kant explicitly distances himself:←49 | 50→
“Tetens investigates the concepts of pure reason merely subjectively (human nature), I objectively. The former analysis is empirical, the latter transcendental” (AA XVIII, p. 23)57
Similarly to time, space also cannot be regarded as a concept, as something induced from experience but rather as a law, a function, presupposed in each perception as a condition of its organisation. As anticipated, here Kant refers to space as ‘schema’:
“Space is not something objective and real nor is it a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; it is, rather, subjective and ideal; it issues from the nature of the mind in accordance with a stable law as a schema, so to speak, for co-ordinating everything which is sensed externally.” (AA II, p. 403)58
Kant here expresses himself no further on ‘outline’ (the English translation of the Latin ‘schema’),
