other languages is often part of more complex, linguistic constructions (such as schema perceptionis) or it is used more as a way to define terms rather than something that requires explicit definition itself. It is regarded as a synonym for a figure of speech, “life of pretence”, arguments, or it is used to describe the process of the constitution of ideas and then referred to as schema perceptionis (i.e. in reference to perceptions, and not as an autonomous term). ‘Schema’ is not treated as a separate topic of its own, but rather it is used in the definition and explanations of other concepts and ideas. This lack of interest in defining the notion has probably led to the multiplicity of its meanings in different contexts. As we will see in the subsequent chapters there are similarities between Kant’s conception and certain aspects of the views of predecessors such as Thomasius, Darjes and Tetens46.
Kant might be accused of having disregarded the accounts of his predecessors concerning the notion of schemata. In the Critique of Pure Reason he makes several references to Plato, Aristotle, Bacon and Tetens, but none of these are devoted to the topic of schemata. However, Kant will build a doctrine of schemata whose meaning finds, in the Critique of Pure Reason, its greater epistemic and philosophical expression and complexity. It can be used as a main element for explaining the possibility of objective knowledge and the relation between sensibility and understanding. I shall show that Kant has the merit to have provided schemata with a definition (or definitions) and a precise role in his thought.←40 | 41→
4 From skhein, aorist of ekhō (whose general meanings are: to have, to hold, to keep).
5 “[…] οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ οὐδ’ ἐπιστήµῃ περὶ Ὁµήρου λέγεις ἃ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ µοίρᾳ καὶ κατοκωχῇ, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου µόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ µέλους ὀξέως ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ µέλος καὶ σχηµάτων καὶ ῥηµάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντιζουσιν.”
6 Catoni (Catoni 2013), focuses on the meaning of ‘schema’ in relation to the ancient view of arts and dances as processes of sensibilisation of what belongs not to sensibility.
7 “[…] ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε ῥᾴδια φύεσθαι, γµενάότε, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας τυχόντα ἧς δεῖ, τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶνκαὶ χείρους κατέχειν ὀρθότατα δύναιτ’ ἂν τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν περὶ θεοὺς ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ,περὶθυσίας τε καὶ καθαρµοὺς τῶν περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, οὐ σχήµασι τεχνάζοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ τιµῶντας (d.) ἀρετήν, ὃ δὴ καὶ µέγιστόν ἐστι συµπάντων πάσῃ τῇ πόλει.”
8 However, since this dialogue was not written by Plato, the rhetorical use of the term has to be considered as a more central Platonic one.
9 “[…] δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάντες ἀτελεῖς οἱ συλλογισμοί, καὶ ὅτι τελειοῦνται διὰ τῶν προειρημένων σχημάτων.”
10 Russell uses it to indicate propositional functions: “A propositional function […] may be taken to be a mere schema, a mere shell, an empty receptacle for meaning, not something already significant” (Russell 1919, p. 157) and later Tarski refers to syntactic schemata in his paper on truth definition (Tarski 1983, p. 157; p. 160; p. 172).
11 Van Deusen 2011, p. 189; http://www.etymonline.com/word/figure.
12 “Ornari orationem Graeci putant, si verborum immutationibus utantur, quos appellant τρπους, et sententiarum orationisque formis, quae vocant σχήματα”.
13 Another expression related to ‘schema’ and ‘figura’ is ‘species intelligibilis’, that is the first Latin translation (made by Cicero) of the Platonic ‘idea’. This notion is related to ‘schema’, insofar as it was used to address a mediating function of cognition by Thomas Aquinas: “on the one hand, it is a reality in itself, which is particular and individual, while on the other hand, it is a similitude, which is universal. Therefore, Thomas claims, the species as individual entity is capable of providing universal knowledge: it is singular and accidental in itself, but it also enables the human intellect to attain knowledge of universal essences.” (Spruit 1994, p. 169)
14 “9. - 15. Haec dicta sunt propter quod ait Apostolus, nunc per speculum nos videre. Quia vero addidit, in aenigmate; multis hoc incognitum est qui eas litteras nesciunt, in quibus est doctrina quaedam de locutionum modis, quos Graeci ‘tropos’ vocant, eoque graeco vocabulo etiam nos utimur pro latino. Sicut enim ‘schemata’ usitatius dicimus quam ‘figuras’, ita usitatius dicimus ‘tropos’ quam ‘modos’. Singulorum autem modorum sive troporum nomina, ut singula singulis referantur, difficillimum est et insolentissimum latine enuntiare.”
15 “Figura enim est dispositio medii secundum subjectionem et praedicationem, quae scilicet dispositio tripliciter variatur.” (Anonymous 1864)
16 “Schemata argumentosa, directa ad probandu et amplificandu, ut sunt similitude et exemplu.”
17 “Intellectus humanus fertur ad abstracta propter naturam propriam; atque ea, quae fluxa sunt, fingit esse constantia. Melius autem est naturam secare, quan abstrahere, id quod Democriti schola fecit, quae magis penetravit in naturam, quan reliquae. Materia potius considerare debet, et eius Schematismi, et Metaschematismi.”
18 “Cogitatio est actus mentis, quo homo vel mens in cerebro de schematibus a motu corporum externorum per organa sensuum cerebro impressis aliquid per modum discursus et orationis verbis constantis vel affirmat vel negat vel querit.”
19 “[…] aber wir müssen auch derer Entium rationis nicht vergessen, die in des Menschen Verstand einzig und alleine ihr Wesen haben. Diese sind nichts anderes als die eingedruckten schemata oder Idee von denen wircklichen Dingen und derer Zusammensetzung
