a method similar to a mathematical one: for instance, taking claims such as: “7+5=12”, philosophy has to show how they are related to experience. In order to achieve this task, Kant relies on a method through which objects are constructed following rules of the understanding, which is similar to the mathematical method (Jiménez Rodríguez 2016, p. 440). This is a point which Kant consistently sticks to, as shown in the Critique of Pure Reason and in a footnote contained in the late On a Discovery whereby any New Critique of Pure Reason is to be made Superfluous by an Older One (Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll):
“Hence it is also requisite for one to make an abstract concept sensible, i.e. display the object that corresponds to it in intuition, since without this the concept would remain (as one says) without sense, i.e. without significance. Mathematics fulfils this requirement by means of the construction of the figure, which is an appearance present to the senses (even though brought about a priori). In the same science, the concept of magnitude seeks its standing and sense in number, but seeks this in turn in the fingers, in the beads of an abacus, or in strokes and points that are placed before the eyes. The concept is always generated a priori, together with the synthetic principles or formulas from such concepts; but their use and relation to supposed objects can in the end be sought nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which (as far as its form concerned) is contained in them a priori.”(KrV A240-B299)50←43 | 44→
“In a general sense one may call construction all exhibition of a concept through the (spontaneous) production of a corresponding intuition. If it occurs through mere imagination in accordance with an a priori concept, it is called pure construction (such as must underlie all the demonstrations of the mathematician; hence he can demonstrate by means of a circle which he draws with his stick in the sand, no matter how irregular it may turn out to be, the properties of a circle in general, as perfectly as if it had been etched in copperplate by the greatest artist). If it is carried out on some kind of material, however, it could be called empirical construction. The first can also be called schematic, the second technical construction.” (AA VIII, p. 192)51
Besides Jiménez Rodriguez, Young Ahn Kang also remarks on the connection between mathematical construction and schematism:
“[…] the construction of a concept is an act of providing a concept with objective reality (cf. Entdeckung BA 10–11; Fortschritte A183). In other words, constructability is a semantic rule of mathematical cognition. It makes possible a meaningful use of mathematical concepts on the one hand, and it restricts the valid sphere of mathematical knowledge to the sensible world on the other (Prolegomena § 13 note). The presentation of a concept in intuition (mathematical schematism) provides the concept with ‘sense and meaning’ (Sinn und Bedeutung) (Prolegomena § 8). Thus, construction has the same function as the transcendental schema both in in its realizing and restricting of the pure concepts at the same time (A147/B187).” (Kang 1985, p. 51)
After these considerations, that stress that there are hints to the problem of schematism in works before the Critique, I now move on to the analysis of the passages ←44 | 45→in which Kant makes use of the term ‘schema’ in his pre-critical writings. In the first part of the chapter I will focus on the metaphysical meaning of ‘schema’ as presented in the New Elucidation, while in the second part I will consider the various meanings of the term in the Dissertation from 1770, namely: “adumbratio”, “outline”. I want to stress how the use of ‘schema’ changes from indicating a mere unclear outline to addressing the form through which the coordination of impressions is possible. Finally, since the notion of schema occurs in reference to space and time, I shall analyse how Kant positions himself in contemporary debates over realism and idealism about space and time.
2.1 The metaphysical notion of schema in the Nova Dilucidatio
The first appearance of Kant’s use of the term ‘schema’ is found in the Principiorum Primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidato of the year 1755. The aim of this work, presented by Kant to receive permission to teach philosophy at the Faculty of Königsberg, is to clarify the first principles of knowledge. The New Elucidation (Nova Dilucidatio) deals with the value of the principles of non-contradiction and sufficient reason, from which Kant derives two principles of metaphysical knowledge: succession and coexistence. The former establishes that the possibility of change in a substance depends on its connection to other substances; the latter affirms that without a common principle of existence (the divine understanding), no relation among substances would be possible. It is first in the demonstration and second in the clarification of the latter that the noun ‘schema’ can be found.
According to the demonstration of the principle of succession each substance is separated and intelligible in itself and has no relation to the others, since they are not the cause of each other’s existence. Therefore, to explain the relation among substances, it is necessary to address their common cause, God, intended as a general principle of existence of all entities. However, this reference is not sufficient, because it might be the case that God caused the existence of separated entities, without them having relation to each other. For this reason a further clarification is needed, namely that God determines not only the existence but also the mutual relations of things and it is in this context where Kant speaks for the first time of a certain ‘schema’:
“But it does not follow from the fact that God simply established the existence of things that there is also a reciprocal relation between those things, unless the self-same schema of the divine understanding (intellectus divini schema), which gives existence, also ←45 | 46→established the relations of things to each other, by conceiving their existences as correlated with each other.”(AA I, p. 413)52
Later on, in the context of the clarification of the principle of coexistence, a second occurrence of the notion of a schema is found:
“The schema of the divine understanding, the origin of existences, is an enduring act (it is called preservation); and in that act, if any substances are conceived by God as existing in isolation and without any relational determinations, no connection between them and no reciprocal relation would come into being.” (AA I, p. 414)53
In this passage, Kant explains that God’s activity, which brings things into existence and mutual commerce, is not an instantaneous and punctual act, but rather an enduring one, called conservation, thus providing the reason why things endure and have relations persisting in time.
As demonstrated in lines mentioned above, the notion of schema in this work possesses a mere metaphysical sense: it refers to a divine project or organisation, and it can be regarded as a synonym for ‘divine understanding’. It is close to a general and common way of using the term as a synonym for order, structure and it is thus far from the epistemological and logical views of some of Kant’s predecessors.
As already anticipated the literature on the use of ‘schema’ in the pre-critical writings is scarce. In the Kant-Lexikon Martin Schönefeld refers only indirectly to ‘schemata’, in order to explain the forms of the sensible world, without further inquiring if there is a distinction between the meaning of ‘schema’ in the Dissertation from 1770 and the Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, in the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie Stegmeier (Stegmeier 1992, pp. 1249–1252) only reports where the term ‘schema’ appears in the text, while Jiménez Rodríguez claims that the Dissertation from 1770 contains
